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OUTSOURCING CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
Kishanthi Parella ∗
Abstract: This Article addresses the problem of preventing human rights violations
abroad that result from the globalization of business. It specifically explores the challenge of
improving labor standards in global value chains. The modern business has changed
dramatically and has “gone global” in order to court foreign markets and secure resources,
including labor. Familiar household names, such as Nike and Apple, have “outsourced”
many of their functions to suppliers overseas. As multinational buyers, they dominate one
end of the global value chain. At the opposite end of the value chain are the local managers
and owners of the factories and workhouses where tablets are assembled, running shoes are
made, and gowns are sown. These facilities are often the sites of serious human rights
violations, such as forced labor and child labor.
Some actors have attempted to rein in transnational corporate misconduct through
litigation in domestic courts regarding the corporation’s actions abroad. However, after
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, it is unclear how successful such strategies will prove in
the future. This Article takes a different approach and focuses on preventing these human
rights violations by improving labor practices in global value chains. Unfortunately, current
approaches focus on encouraging better due diligence regarding the behavior of their
suppliers. These approaches rely on auditing, monitoring, and disclosures and have
dominated international (UN’s Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework), national (Danish
Act on Financial Statement), and sub-state (California’s Transparency in Supply Chains Act
of 2010) efforts to combat human rights violations. However, this Article explains that these
and similar efforts will have limited effects because of the problem of misaligned incentives
between buyers and suppliers in global value chains. Suppliers have different business
profiles, interests, and constraints compared to their multinational buyers. Therefore,
conventional drivers for better labor practices that rely on reputational risks and consumer
boycotts will not work for suppliers. Instead, public actors and other stakeholders must
identify incentives that are appropriate for suppliers. Second, they must also adopt a reflexive
law governance approach in order to transmit these incentives effectively in global value
chains. This Article concludes by offering examples of strategies that public actors should
adopt in order to prevent another Foxconn or Rana Plaza tragedy.
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INTRODUCTION
The key problem for international business law in this new
millennium is the effective regulation of the global, fragmented firm.1
Globalization has enabled corporate entities to span continents and
establish dominions previously reserved for kings and statesmen. But
whereas rules of international law evolved to curb the excesses of these
latter types of actors, there is today a lack of similar rules to contend
with this century’s new titans. This is the reason that many global firms
operate in this unregulated space between national borders.
Although a variety of national laws and corporate policies may speak
to environmental and labor standards that businesses should abide by,
these businesses enjoy a multitude of options regarding the structure of
their operations. Their functions—from product concept, development,
manufacturing, sales, shipping, and customer service—can be distributed
across a variety of actors and several continents so that no two functions
occur in the same place. This freedom allows businesses to escape the
dictates of national regulation in favor of a less regulated space. As a
result, headlines are filled with stories of corporate wrongdoing,
including the tragedies at Rana Plaza in Bangladesh and Foxconn in
China. According to the U.N. Special Representative for Business and
Human Rights John Ruggie,
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament
today lies in the governance gaps created by globalization between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors,
and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse
consequences. These governance gaps provide the permissive
environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds
without adequate sanctioning or reparation. 2
As a result, public actors and other stakeholders around the world have
been confounded as to how to respond when the causes and effects of
such crises are separated by an ocean.
1. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 501 (2009); Charles Sabel et al., Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for Continuous
Improvement in the Global Workplace (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Grp., Paper No. 21, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
262178.
2. U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, Report of
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A
Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Human Rights Council, 189 U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Framework].
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This Article argues that the solution to the “governance gap” is for
stakeholders to adopt the very strategy at the root of the transnational
governance challenge: outsource. The advantage of outsourcing for the
business sector is that it allows companies to delegate and distribute
roles among several actors in a manner that avoids duplication of efforts,
capitalizes on the functional advantages of the actors, and adds value
through a progression of steps. Firms like Nike and Apple chose to focus
on a narrower set of core competencies that better reflected their
specialized skills and the activities they believed would garner the most
value. This outsourcing also made it more difficult for government
actors to control giants like Nike and Apple because of geographic
constraints, jurisdictional limitations, capacity, resources, and proximity.
The solution, therefore, may be for government actors and other
stakeholders to adopt the approach that businesses followed when faced
with similar constraints: fragmentation according to functional
specialization where the efforts of stakeholders are sequentially aligned
in a series of value-adding activities.
The effective governance of transnational business activities requires
that actors match the outsourced structure of the modern firm with an
outsourced approach to regulating the fragmented firm. “Outsourced
regulation” requires decentralization along two key dimensions:
incentives and governance. The first dimension of decentralization
relates to the model of the firm that stakeholders aim to regulate:
unitary-actor model or fragmented-firm model. Decentralization along
this dimension requires acknowledging that not all the actors in the
global value chain are the same. In fact, these actors have different
interests, business profiles, and constraints. Incentives for cooperation,
therefore, must speak to this diversity in the value chain. 3
However, designing incentives for all the actors in the value chain is
not enough. Stakeholders must also have an effective way of
transmitting those incentives to the relevant actors. The second
dimension of decentralization, therefore, relates to the governance
choices stakeholders face regarding how to transmit incentives in the
value chain. One significant reason that current laws and standards speak
to the interests of some, but not all, of the actors in the value chain is
because of the challenge of transmitting incentives across a diverse
group of actors who are geographically separated, culturally distinct, and
often have very different business profiles. Any government actor will

3. George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing Transactions, 96 VA. L.
REV. 241, 267 (2010) (examining the problem of aligning incentives in outsourced relationships).
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be severely limited in their ability to offer incentives to such a diverse
group. As a consequence, many government actors simply target one end
of the value chain because it is within their jurisdictional reach.
However, this is a more significant problem for “centralized” forms of
governance, such as command and control regulation, that rely on one
dominant actor, such as the state. This problem can be overcome by
shifting to a decentralized approach to governance that involves a variety
of stakeholders.
There are two main “decentralized” options for transmitting
incentives in the global value chain: network coordination or reflexive
coordination. Transnational regulatory networks have arisen as a forum
for actors—usually from the sub-state level—to interact with one
another to share information, harmonize standards, and improve
enforcement efforts. 4 These networks have tackled issues such as
securities regulation, banking supervision, insurance, and the
environment. 5 However, a number of features of networks make this an
inappropriate setting for government actors and other stakeholders to
develop strategies for enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
norms in global value chains.
Instead, government actors should consider using reflexive law as a
way to coordinate their activities. Reflexive law is an approach to
regulation that avoids direct intervention in favor of establishing
procedures and policies that are intended to encourage the target industry
to adopt a socially desirable course of conduct. 6 The significance of this
approach for current practices is that public actors should differentiate
between target and intermediate actors. If they cannot directly
incentivize a target actor (such as a factory manager located overseas),
they should identify an intermediate actor who possesses leverage over
the target actor and exercise their leverage over that intermediary actor.
Reflexive law approaches are part of a broader strategy of new
4. Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J.
257, 290–91 (2011); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order,
40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 290 (2004) [hereinafter Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power]; Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated
Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1053 (2003) [hereinafter Slaughter, Global Government
Networks]; see also David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of
International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 284–85 (1998).
5. Zaring, supra note 4, at 282; see also Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L.
1, 12 (2002).
6. David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness,
25 J. CORP. L. 41, 48–51 (1999); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV.
1227, 1264 (1995).
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approaches to governing the modern firm, including encouraging
government actors to persuade indirectly where before they commanded
directly. 7
The critical insight offered by this Article is that responses to
tragedies like Foxconn and Rana Plaza will fail if they do not
decentralize along both of these dimensions. This insight is intended for
those government actors who are championing a new generation of CSR
strategies that seek to reform the value chain through heightened
transparency. 8 For example, in California, the Transparency in Supply
Chains Act of 2010 requires that covered firms publicly disclose the
nature and extent of their supplier monitoring. 9 California’s approach is
part of a broader strategy to address human rights violations in value
chains by forcing corporations to disclose in the hope that such
disclosures will encourage them to know and act regarding what goes on
in their value chains. 10 Denmark, for example, has also mandated similar
social reporting, 11 and the European Commission is considering
adopting similar standards. 12 The United Nations also introduced the
Guiding Principles that are intended to implement the Protect, Respect,
Remedy Framework, including the corporate responsibility to respect. 13
All these initiatives attempt to improve transparency and consumer
knowledge of the value chain and thereby increase monitoring and

7. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1, at 520–21; David Hess, The Three Pillars of Corporate
Social Reporting as New Governance Regulation: Disclosure, Dialogue and Development, 18 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 447, 450 (2008). See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and
the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Susan
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 458 (2001).
8. See Meredith R. Miller, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Working Conditions in the Global
Supply Chain: Accountability Through Transparency in Private Ordering (October 20, 2013)
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2342756.
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2012).
10. See Sabel, et al., supra note 1, at 16–17.
11. See Karin Buhmann, The Danish CSR Reporting Requirement as Reflexive Law: Employing
CSR as a Modality to Promote Public Policy (Univ. of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 2011-36, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1964220.
12. European Commission, Environmental OREP, Commission to Propose Mandatory Company
Reporting of Environmental and Social Performance (Aug. 8, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/resource_efficiency/news/up-to-date_news/08032013_en.htm.
13. U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, Report of
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework,
U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie).
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oversight by businesses of the practices of their suppliers.
This Article illustrates the weaknesses of these approaches by
illustrating the problem of misaligned incentives between buyers and
suppliers in the value chain. Current due diligence standards concerning
the value chain offer incentives that are more appropriate for the model
of a single, integrated firm rather than the present reality of a diversity of
actors operating in a global value chain. These approaches privilege the
interests of one end of this value chain (the end in the developed world)
to the neglect of the other actors in the chain. The assumption is that the
business that the government is targeting is in a position to determine
outcome (achieve compliance) and therefore the government tailors the
incentives for cooperation to these actors. But the global value chain for
a U.S. business can now involve several layers of suppliers. At one end
is a multinational buyer, such as a large brand-name firm. At the
opposite end of the value chain are the local managers and owners of the
factories and work-houses where tablets are assembled, running shoes
are made, and gowns are sewn. These facilities are often the sites of
serious human rights violations, such as forced labor, child labor, and
environmental contamination. 14 Effective CSR strategies require
acknowledging the interests and constraints of buyers and suppliers in
these global value chains.
It is true that the California approach acknowledges the global value
chain structure by requiring firms to perform due diligence on their
suppliers and disclose their efforts. 15 But the incentives for cooperation
with California’s mandate are suited to the firms within their jurisdiction
but not the other actors in the value chain. As a result, the incentives
offered in these approaches do not apply equally to all the parties in the
chain and therefore exert limited “pull” on all the different actors.
Admittedly, firms that operate in California, such as multinational brand
and retail firms, often enjoy more power in the value chain than other
actors and therefore may be in a better position to influence cooperation
from their suppliers. But even if their suppliers do not have much power,
they are not completely powerless. In fact, they often possess just
enough power to resist these top-down approaches to corporate social
responsibility. This resistance takes many forms. Some suppliers
respond to more robust standards by further “outsourcing” their
workforce in favor of temporary, contract labor who receive less legal
14. See CHARLES KERNAGHAN, THE NAT’L LABOR COMM., CHILD LABOR IS BACK: CHILDREN
AGAIN SEWING CLOTHING FOR MAJOR U.S. COMPANIES 1 (2006), available at
http://www.globallabourrights.org/reports/child-labor-is-back.
15. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
ARE
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protection. The ability of suppliers to hide their transgressions is
facilitated by the willing ignorance of many of their multinational
buyers. When on-site inspections do occur, suppliers counteract this
threat by orchestrating the process to provide a false image of
compliance. Through these and similar strategies, suppliers continue to
maintain current practices and display little motivation to improve
conditions. These are among the reasons that increased monitoring and
auditing by corporate actors will not lead to the results desired.
Supplier audit evasion is a product of the subordination of supplier
interests in the incentive structures of international, national, and private
CSR initiatives. In these various approaches, there is an underlying
assumption of harmony of interests among the variety of actors who
operate in the modern global value chain. However, we are no longer
dealing with a vertically integrated business. The different firms that
operate in the global value chain have varying—even conflicting—
interests and differ in location, size, capacity, and functional specialties.
It is these interests and the resulting cost/benefit calculations that
determine these actors’ receptivity or resistance to improving CSR.
Disproportionate attention to multinational buyers (such as large brand
name retailers in the developed world) foster conclusions that media
exposure, consumer boycotts, and other forms of reputational risks can
secure better practices in global value chains. However, suppliers (such
as local factory owners and managers in overseas facilities) are
motivated by other sets of factors. The incentives that would secure their
cooperation in improving standards vary from those of their
multinational customers. Moreover, they are the parties who are “on the
ground” and can determine the degree of implementation of improved
CSR. 16 The real challenge is adequately incentivizing them to adopt
better practices, and that requires formulating an incentive structure that
speaks to all actors in the chain and not just one end. Failure to do so
results in tension along the value chain, whereby downstream consumers
and retail firms demand better production methods but upstream
suppliers resist changes and simply hide the extent of their violations.
This Article makes the following significant contributions. First, it
examines the largely understudied phenomena in legal scholarship of
global value chains and the challenges of the global, fragmented firm
that has outsourced and off-shored many of its functions. This is a
significant project because the problem studied in this Article—labor

16. Stephanie Barrientos & Sally Smith, Do Workers Benefit from Ethical Trade? Assessing
Codes of Labour Practice in Global Production Systems, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 713, 720 (2007).
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standards in global value chains—is a manifestation of a greater problem
confronting business law: devising an incentive structure that is
applicable to the modern, transnational business. As such, the problems
diagnosed in this Article, and the solutions offered, apply not only to the
issue of improving corporate social responsibility but also to issues
surrounding governance of a business that has outsourced many of its
functions.
This Article’s second contribution is the explanation of why the new
wave of CSR strategies, which emphasize disclosure, monitoring, and
audits will have limited effect. This is an important insight because a
number of jurisdictions (such as California and Denmark) have already
adopted this approach and it may become the template for future public
responses in Europe and the United States. 17 This Article seeks to reform
these strategies by clarifying the reasons why human rights abuses occur
in the value chain. Section II distinguishes between asymmetries of
information and asymmetries in rent and risk. This distinction is
significant because it identifies the limitations of the current CSR
strategies that seek to improve monitoring and disclosure and, therefore,
only address the first problematic asymmetry. By providing an
alternative explanation of the problem and exploring the understudied
issue of supplier interests, it highlights the weaknesses of current
incentives and offers suggestions on the types of incentives that would
improve CSR strategies.
Finally, this Article begins a normative conversation regarding the
types of approaches that public actors should support in order to reform
problematic value chains. It does not claim to provide a solution for
eliminating all abuses from all value chains. Instead, its objective is
more modest: identify the flaws of the current approaches and explain
the importance of decentralization in response to value chain problems.
Section III introduces the two dimensions of decentralization—
incentives and governance—and explains the importance of each and the
problems that arise when one or more dimensions are centralized as
opposed to decentralized. Although it will not eliminate all abuses,
decentralization will improve the effectiveness of CSR initiatives,
especially those involving brand firms. Section IV sketches the types of
CSR strategies that emerge from a decentralized approach. This section
also reveals that a decentralized approach to CSR resembles the
fragmentation of industries that public actors are attempting to regulate.

17. See supra notes 12, 14 and accompanying text; Hess, supra note 7, at 447 (“Overall, social
reporting is on the verge of becoming a mainstream phenomenon.”).
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The organizational mirroring of the regulators and the regulated aids the
former in overcoming many of the challenges of regulating a
fragmented, heterogeneous, transnational value chain.
I.

THE AGE OF OUTSOURCING

Many readers own an Apple iPhone, iPad, or similar gadget.
However, most people do not know where these products are made. At
one end of Apple’s value chain are the “upstream suppliers,” such as
local managers and factory owners, who manufacture the iPhones, iPods,
and iPads. They are “upstream” in the global value chain because they
are the ones who supply the goods that are destined for Apple and
consumers later down in the chain. At the other end of the value chain
are the “downstream buyers,” such as Apple, who purchase the goods
manufactured by the suppliers and, in turn, sell them to consumers. The
following Section provides an overview of global value chains that is
useful for understanding the interests and attitudes of Apple’s suppliers.
Section A describes the shift to outsourced production, and Section B
provides an example of the types of human rights problems that
outsourcing can cause.
A.

Rise of the Fragmented Firm

Apple is a corporate behemoth. It became so, in part, by mastering the
global value chain. 18 It is one of many American firms that abandoned
vertical integration of their production in favor of a model that connects
multiple tiers of firms of varying sizes, specialties, and geographic
locations. 19 Previously, vertical integration of production occurred when
a firm assumed the tasks associated with taking a product from concept
to the end-user—including design, manufacturing, testing, packaging,
and marketing. Although this form of organization had dominated the
early part of the past century, it has been steadily challenged by an
alternative model that largely externalizes manufacturing tasks (as well
as an increasing array of functions) to outside firms (either domestically
or internationally). 20 Under this alternative approach, product innovation
is separated from product manufacturing, so that those who design the
18. Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs Are Built into an iPad, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-andthe-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
19. See Gerald F. Davis, After the Corporation, 41 POL. & SOC’Y 283, 294–95 (2013).
20. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm
Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 434 (2009).
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products are seldom the same parties who actually assemble them. 21
Instead, a growing class of “contract manufacturers” take over the
production tasks for firms so that firms can focus on other activities that
are better suited to their skill set or result in higher returns. Broad swaths
of industry have shifted to this outsourced model as familiar household
names divest their production facilities and increasingly rely on overseas
suppliers.
Why do firms choose to outsource and send abroad what they used to
do at home? Answering this question harks back to Ronald Coase’s
theory of firm organization in The Nature of the Firm. 22 All firms—
whether they are globally oriented or not—confront the same dilemma:
do they internally produce their own inputs or contract with external
parties to do the same work? According to Coase, transaction costs help
firms answer this question and, consequently, demarcate the boundary of
the firm. 23 The transaction costs involved with contracting (negotiation,
coordination, etc.) lead firms to produce internally what they can
outsource externally. 24 However, internal production is not free from
transaction costs either. Instead, firms face declining returns to
management that result from higher production costs and internal
inefficiencies. 25 Firms navigate these competing risks so that the
“optimal location of economic activity is the result of a careful balance
between production cost savings from using markets, and transaction
cost savings (again, broadly defined) from using firms.” 26 Further
complicating this calibration is the reality that transaction and
production costs are not fixed but fluctuate according to many factors,
such as new technologies. 27 As a result, “the borders of a firm will
continue to change as the underlying tension between production costs
and transaction costs oscillates.” 28
These considerations mean that firms confront several choices
regarding the organization of their production when they court foreign
21. Victoria Curzon Price, Some Causes and Consequences of Fragmentation, in
FRAGMENTATION 88, 88 (Sven Arndt & Henry Kierzkowski eds., 2001) (“‘Fragmentation’ refers to
the growing complexity of the modern chain of production, which divides and redivides previously
integrated systems into ever more specialized and distinguishable units.”).
22. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
23. Id. at 390.
24. Id. at 390–91.
25. Id. at 394; Geis, supra note 3, at 245–46.
26. George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 955, 971 (2007).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 970–71.
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markets and labor pools. They may choose to establish their own
production plants in overseas locations for a number of perceived
advantages. For example, they may prefer to control production out of a
desire to protect proprietary technology and knowledge or due to other
business advantages that may be compromised through too much
decentralization. 29 For such reasons, firms may decide to retain all the
economic activities “under one ownership roof” even if these processes
could be subcontracted and despite the fact that production occurs in
more than one country. 30 The inability to separate production into
discrete tasks or to communicate production knowledge to a supplier
also precludes such externalization. 31
Alternatively, firms may prefer not to own the facilities in which their
products are made or assembled and may instead opt to work with
various independent actors in the production process through a series of
market transactions. The choice to do this is facilitated by decreasing
transaction costs that result from lower transportation costs, improved
electronic communication, and trade liberalization. 32 Due to the internet,
“[a] business executive will know, as never before, what is available, at
what price, in what quantity, to what quality, when and where—at a
click of a button.” 33 These declining market costs may therefore “reduce
the advantage of internalizing activities within the firm, and therefore
reduce its size, forcing it to ‘outsource’ all but its core activities.” 34
Novel contracting arrangements also lead to new possibilities for
cooperation at the boundary of the firm. 35 These two possibilities

29. Price, supra note 21, at 95.
30. Id. at 95.
31. Peter Lund-Thomsen & Khalid Nadvi, Clusters, Chains and Compliance: Corporate Social
Responsibility and Governance in Football Manufacturing in South Asia, 93 J. BUS. ETHICS 201,
204 (2010) (explaining that in the literature on global value chains, “the specific governance
outcome in a given value chain is determined by the capability of suppliers, the nature and
complexity of the transaction involved, and the ability to which information can be codified”).
32. Geis, supra note 26, at 960–62 (“Relatively high transaction costs have historically prevented
firms from tapping into the global supply of labor. As these costs drop, however—through
improvements in communication, digitization, standardization, and the like—it becomes economical
for firms to embrace overseas production. In essence, falling interaction costs have unlocked a
massive supply of labor, driving down the price of economic inputs, realigning business processes,
and tempting (or forcing) managers to move production outside the firm.” (citations omitted)).
33. Price, supra note 21, at 100.
34. Id.
35. See Geis, supra note 26, at 962 (“[B]usiness outsourcing has thrived in recent years not only
because globalization has unlocked inexpensive production markets, but also because it is becoming
easier for firms to monitor and prevent the agency costs of outsourcing.”); Gilson et al., supra note
20, at 435.
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constitute opposite poles of a spectrum upon which a firm can arrange its
level of integration with those who manufacture its products. 36
Apple eventually chose to go with the second route (or close to it) 37
and this production model has contributed to Apple’s emergence as one
of the world’s most successful corporate giants. The product that helped
get Apple to that enviable pinnacle is the iconic iPhone: a pretty, usable,
affordable piece of the future that allows the user to access every mode
of communication—all within the convenience of their own palm. This
product defined the “smartphone” industry, which in turn defined a
generation of texters, tweeters, and social-networking aficionados.
Although the iPhone and its peer smartphones rest within the hands of
many in the United States, these products are not made here. Instead, the
components are sourced from a number of countries and many hands—
mostly foreign—help build each individual iPhone. Apple’s success is
partially due to its ability to coordinate the manufacture of such a
sophisticated product in an even more sophisticated value chain
involving various actors and several continents. This value chain has
many characteristics, each of which will be discussed in turn below.
1. Spatial Dispersion
Most of the components of an iPhone are not made in the United
States. 38 Instead, an estimated ninety percent of iPhone components are
manufactured abroad: 39 Germany and Taiwan supply the advanced
semiconductors, Korea and Japan supply the memory, Korea and
Taiwan provide the display panels and circuitry, Europe provides the
chipsets, and Africa and Asia supply the rare metals.40 China does the
rest and puts it all together. 41 Apple does employ 43,000 workers in the
United States, 42 but this figure does not reflect Apple’s true work
force—the one that produces the millions of Apple iPods, iPhones, and

36. See Lund-Thomsen & Nadvi, supra note 31, at 204.
37. Marcelo Prince & Willa Plank, A Short History of Apple’s Manufacturing in the U.S., WALL
STREET J. (Dec. 6, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/12/06/a-short-history-of-applesmanufacturing-in-the-u-s/.
38. P.K., Slicing an Apple, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.economist.com/blogs/
dailychart/2011/08/apple-and-samsungs-symbiotic-relationship [hereinafter Slicing an Apple].
39. Charles Duhigg & Keith Bradsher, How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/business/apple-america-and-a-squeezed-middleclass.html?pagewanted=all.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.

08 - Parella_Ready for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/9/2014 4:56 PM

760

[Vol. 89:747

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

other products that Apple sells annually. Instead, a staggering 700,000
additional foreign workers are employed by Apple’s contractors, such as
Foxconn. 43
Why are Apple’s products made overseas and not in the United
States? Most Americans believe that the location of manufacturing
abroad is due to wage differences between American workers and their
foreign counterparts. This is only a part of the truth. Labor costs are only
a small fraction of the cost in technology manufacturing. 44 In theory,
therefore, Apple could pay American wages and still secure considerable
rewarding margins. 45 What it cannot find in the United States are the
scale and flexibility offered by foreign plants. 46 A story relating to
Apple’s former leadership, Steve Jobs, is revealing. In 2007, Mr. Jobs
demanded an unscratchable glass screen for the iPhone. 47 And he wanted
it in six weeks. 48 There was only one location that could deliver on Mr.
Jobs’ demand: China. In China, subsidies from the government had
aided the glass-cutting factories so that the factories could offer Apple
warehouses filled with glass samples and skilled engineers. 49 And they
offered it all to Apple for free or next to free. 50 The owners of the
Chinese factories had also built dormitories on site so that “employees
would be available 24 hours a day.” 51 How could Apple say no?
According to a former Apple executive,
The first truckloads of cut glass arrived at Foxconn City in the
dead of night . . . . That’s when managers woke thousands of
workers, who crawled into their uniforms — white and black
shirts for men, red for women — and quickly lined up to
assemble, by hand, the phones. Within three months, Apple had
sold one million iPhones. Since then, Foxconn has assembled

43. Id.
44. Id. (“In part, Asia was attractive because the semiskilled workers there were cheaper. But that
wasn’t driving Apple. For technology companies, the cost of labor is minimal compared with the
expense of buying parts and managing supply chains that bring together components and services
from hundreds of companies.” (emphasis added)).
45. Id.
46. Id. (“It isn’t just that workers are cheaper abroad. Rather, Apple’s executives believe the vast
scale of overseas factories as well as the flexibility, diligence and industrial skills of foreign workers
have so outpaced their American counterparts that ‘Made in the U.S.A.’ is no longer a viable option
for most Apple products.”).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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over 200 million more. 52
The ability to scale up and down quickly was especially important for
Apple because it had experienced difficulties in the past with responding
to changes in consumer demands. 53
Additionally, Apple could not find the pool of skilled workers that it
needed for its assembly lines. The company had projected a need for
8,700 industrial engineers to supervise the staff of 200,000 assembly line
workers needed for making the iPhones. 54 Apple’s analysts “forecast[ed]
it would take as long as nine months to find that many qualified
engineers in the United States. In China, it took 15 days.” 55 Additionally,
regulatory competition tends to favor Chinese markets. China boasts
“flexible land-use, labour, and environmental rules” so that “China can
erect a massive operation in no time at all, staffed with compliant labour
and with little concern about the impact of the factory on watersheds, air
quality, and traffic.” 56 This contributes to one of China’s chief
advantages: the ability for Apple to scale its production up and down
rapidly. 57
Re-shoring Apple’s manufacturing work back to the United States
would therefore require significant changes in both national and global
economies. 58 Securing a reliable pool of the relevant skilled labor is only
part of the challenge. Another challenge is that supply chains for
consumer electronics are concentrated in Asia. 59 A U.S. firm, therefore,
must decide between manufacturing in the United States and shipping
the component to its customers in Asia—an option that involves long
delays and considerable cost—or constructing an overseas plant next to
its customers in Asia. It is not a surprise that many U.S. firms choose the
52. Id.
53. Gilson et al., supra note 20, at 464. After registering a $740 million quarterly loss, Apple sold
its largest U.S. production facility to SCI, an electronics contract manufacturer. SCI used the former
Apple plant and Apple workers to manufacture Apple’s products, as well as products made by other
firms. This arrangement freed Apple from carrying unnecessary overhead and inventory costs. The
electronics industry could be characterized by a great deal of volatility in consumer demand, which
meant that production scheduling was difficult. Out-sourcing manufacturing meant that retailers and
brand firms no longer had to internalize the costs associated with rapid changes in demand. Timothy
J. Sturgeon, Modular Production Networks: A New American Model of Industrial Organization, 11
IND. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 456–58 (2002).
54. Duhigg & Bradsher, supra note 39.
55. Id.
56. R.A., Supply Chains: Apple and the American Economy, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/01/supply-chains [hereinafter Supply Chains].
57. See Duhigg & Bradsher, supra note 39 (discussing the benefits of Asian supply chains).
58. Id.
59. Supply Chains, supra note 56.
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second option:
It’s possible to coordinate a supply chain that’s draped across an
archipelago of Asian economies. To maximise the return to this
chain, however, it’s still necessary to keep plants reasonably
close together. A plant located in America is too distant from
Asia to make much economic sense . . . . Changing
transportation and communication technologies facilitated a shift
in manufacturing to Asia, then reinforced its presence there. 60
2. Functional Specialization and Value Added
Globalization of production does not only mean that production
occurs in many countries. It also refers to the functional specialization of
actors in different locations and the integration of these disparate
economic activities into a cohesive production plan. Industrial
“fragmentation” is based upon division of labor among a variety of
actors, and the product cycle for the iPhone is distributed across a
variety of different firms.
Each step in the production of an Apple iPhone 4 may be undertaken
by different companies in different countries. 61 The “value added” at
each step of the production process is the difference between the cost of
the inputs and the value of the outputs. 62 In Apple’s value chains, “each
producer purchases inputs and then adds value, which becomes a cost of
the next stage of production. The sum of the value added by everyone in
the chain equals the final product price.” 63
The value chain for another Apple product, the iPod, involves
component suppliers who produce low-value parts, such as capacitors
and resistors. 64 They account for a small share of the total value in the
value chain and the risk of close substitution leads to fierce competition
that exerts a downward pressure on the prices they can charge and the
profit margins they can secure. 65 Some of the components are highvalue, such as visual displays, hard drives, and key integrated circuits. 66
60. Id.
61. Slicing an Apple, supra note 38.
62. Hal R. Varian, Who Really Makes the iPod?, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/technology/28iht-ipod.1.6378095.html.
63. JASON DEDRICK ET AL., ALFRED P. SLOAN FOUNDATION INDUSTRY STUDIES CONFERENCE,
WHO PROFITS FROM INNOVATION IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS?: A STUDY OF THE IPOD AND
NOTEBOOK PCS 1, 6 (2008), available at http://web.mit.edu/is08/pdf/Dedrick_Kraemer_Linden.pdf.
64. Id. at 7–8.
65. Id. at 7.
66. Id.
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These components garner a significant share of the value added because
they “are the most likely to embody proprietary knowledge that helps to
differentiate the final product and to command a commensurately high
margin.” 67 These various components are assembled into a final product
by an original design manufacturer (ODM) or a contract manufacturer
(CM), such as Foxconn, Flextronics, Solectron, Quanta, and Compal.68
These assembly firms also compete fiercely for high-volume orders and
this competition limits the margins they can secure. 69
Brand-name vendors, such as Apple, supply the lion’s share of the
value added to the value chain. They undertake high-value tasks such as
product concept, branding, and marketing. 70 As the lead firm in the iPod
value chain, Apple “contribute[s] market knowledge, intellectual
property, system integration and cost management skills, and a brand
name whose value reflects its reputation for quality, innovation, and
customer service.” 71 Finally, global wholesalers and national and local
distributors undertake distribution services, while large retail chains and
general retailers sell the final products to consumers. 72
Firms choose to divide up labor because, first, it allows them to focus
on what they do best. Nike, an early architect of this model of global
production, chose to leave the manufacturing to its external suppliers
because, in the words of one of its executive, “‘[w]e don’t know the first
thing about manufacturing.” 73 Instead, Nike’s strength was in branding
and marketing, “entail[ing] the construction of a convincing world of
symbols, ideas, and values harnessing the desires of individuals to the
consumption of athletic shoes.” 74 Similarly, Apple does not manufacture
or assemble the components of its iPod, iPhone, or iPad. Instead, it
focuses on strategy, product design, branding, and marketing. 75 The
result of this configuration of the global value chain is that the higher
profit margins are generally found at the consumption end of the value

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Miguel Korzeniewicz, Commodity Chains and Marketing Strategies: Nike and the Global
Athletic Footwear Industry, in COMMODITY CHAINS & GLOBAL CAPITALISM 247, 252 (Gary Gereffi
& Miguel Korzeniewicz eds., 1994).
74. Id. at 251; see also id. at 260.
75. Dedrick et al., supra note 63, at 7.
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chain and not in the manufacturing process. 76
Second, and critically, the reason that market leaders like Apple and
Nike decided to focus on certain tasks and outsource the rest is because
this division of labor allowed these firms to focus on “higher-returns”
segments of global production. For example,
[t]he real value of the [Apple] iPod doesn’t lie in its parts or
even in putting those parts together. The bulk of the iPod’s value
is in the conception and design of the iPod. That is why Apple
gets $80 for each of these video iPods it sells, which is by far the
largest piece of value added in the entire supply chain. Those
clever folks at Apple figured out how to combine 451 mostly
generic parts into a valuable product. They may not make the
iPod, but they created it. In the end, that’s what really matters. 77
Finally, division of labor allowed Nike and Apple to adapt their
sourcing strategies depending on changing labor costs and skill-level
needed for their different products. 78 For example, the manufacture of an
iPhone depends on several discrete tasks, but not all the tasks may
require the same skill level. Apple, therefore, could source the low-skill,
low-cost components from one location but ensure that the few highvalue components are manufactured by higher-skill, high-cost workers. 79
3. Separation of Ownership and Control
Although retailers and brand firms in North America may no longer
own the means of production, this does not mean that they have
relinquished control over the global value chain or the other actors in the
76. Supply Chains, supra note 56 (“[A]s one scales up production of Apple products, there are
vastly different employment needs across the supply chain. So, it doesn’t take lots more designers
and programmers to sell 50m iPhones than it does to sell 10m. You have roughly the same number
of brains involved, and much more profit per brain. On the manufacturing side, by contrast,
employment soars as scale grows. So as the iPhone becomes more popular, you get huge returns to
the ideas produced in Cupertino, and small returns but hundreds of thousands of jobs in China.”
(emphasis added)); see also Dong-Sook S. Gills, Globalization of Production and Women in Asia,
581 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 106, 108 (2002); Richard M. Locke et al.,
Complements or Substitutes? Private Codes, State Regulation and the Enforcement of Labour
Standards in Global Supply Chains, 51 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 519 (2012).
77. Varian, supra note 62; see also Supply Chains, supra note 56.
78. Korzeniewicz, supra note 73 at 260.
79. The fragmentation of large, U.S.-based firms has also affected the evolution of suppliers in
foreign countries. As the former shed functions, the latter developed competencies in these areas
and often expanded in order to match the skill and scale of production required by their buyer firms.
Sturgeon, supra note 53. This reactionary growth facilitates greater fragmentation because firms
may be tempted to outsource more of their functions as the quality of an industry’s supplier base
increases. Id. at 455.
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process. Instead, buying firms exercise tremendous power over suppliers
despite their lack of direct ownership. 80 For example, as the lead firm in
the iPod value chain, Apple is the dominant player. 81 Apple is the “only
company that bargains with all other actors in the value chain” and “[i]n
every relationship with its suppliers, Apple has the greater market
power.” 82
Like many other multinational buying firms, Apple’s power derives
from a combination of large volume orders, retail concentration, and
substitution possibilities. A high concentration of buyers gives these
firms the ability to dictate favorable conditions to their suppliers,
including exerting a strong downward pressure on prices and demanding
greater turnaround times. 83 The threat of substitution looms over the
various tiers of Apple’s value chain and not even the high-value
component manufacturers are invulnerable to this risk. For example,
U.S. company PortalPlayer made the primary microchip that managed
the iPod’s functionality. 84 The component was valuable enough to the
iPod that PortalPlayer secured a gross margin of 44.8 percent in 2005.85
However, as important as PortalPlayer was to Apple, Apple was even
more important to PortalPlayer: “In 2005, Apple’s subcontractors for
iPod assembly accounted for 93 percent of PortalPlayer’s sales.” 86
PortalPlayer’s vulnerability was further compounded because “Apple
[was] no more than one product revision (about 18 months) from being
able to replace even a key supplier like PortalPlayer with acceptable
switching costs.” 87 In fact, that is what Apple did. In 2006, “Apple
began designing iPods without PortalPlayer’s processors in them. The
chip company fell on hard times and was acquired by Nvidia, another
chip company.” 88 If the supplier of a high-value component confronted
such substitution risks, imagine the substitution risks faced by the
various suppliers who produce low-value components for the iPod. Even
80. Gary Gereffi & Joonkoo Lee, Why the World Suddenly Cares About Global Supply Chains,
48 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 24, 25 (2012) (describing modular, relational, and captive governance
strategies in global supply chains).
81. Dedrick et al., supra note 63, at 15.
82. Id. at 16; see also Gary Gereffi, Commodity Chains and Regional Divisions of Labor in East
Asia, 12 J. ASIAN BUS. 75, 83 (1996).
83. Stephanie Barrientos, Contract Labour: The ‘Achilles Heel’ of Corporate Codes in
Commercial Value Chains, 39 DEV. & CHANGE 977, 982 (2008).
84. Dedrick et al., supra note 63, at 13.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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large contract manufacturers like Foxconn, who assemble the Apple
products, are not immune: “As with key components, Apple would incur
some switching costs to change manufacturing service providers.
However, these costs can be minimized by synchronizing them with a
product revision, hence the power in the relationship is once again
mostly on Apple’s side.” 89
The power wielded by Apple and other powerful multinational buyers
allow them to demand lower costs and faster turnaround times. Both of
these factors are important for understanding the conditions at Foxconn
and other overseas production sites. Most suppliers in Apple’s value
chain are only permitted a slim profit margin; therefore, the managers at
these suppliers “push their employees to work longer and faster.” 90
However, low costs are only part of the story. The rest is due to
consumer preferences and the business model that it cultivates. In the
United States and other developed economies, consumers demand new
electronics on an annual basis. 91 This means that a company’s success
depends upon its ability to satisfy consumer preferences for the next
shiny bauble:
Apple lost billions of dollars in market value [in 2012] because it
couldn’t produce enough handsets to meet record demand, one of
several factors that precipitated a 20 percent decline in its share
price at the end of last year. That only underscored the
importance of speed in the supply chain to Apple
executives . . . . 92
Apple responds, therefore, by pushing Foxconn and its other suppliers
to churn out newer models in significant volume and in record time. 93
According to critics of Apple’s value chain,
[c]ompliance will not be easy as long as Apple’s existing
business model remains unchanged. The evidence from other big
consumer brands suggest that most abuses of workers—
particularly when it comes to overtime—occur when a factory is
89. Id. at 15.
90. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 18.
91. Id.; see also Apple’s China Supply Chain Exposed: Interview by Kai Ryssdal with Charles
Duhigg, MARKETPLACE (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/tech/apple-economy/
apples-china-supply-chain-exposed (“Ryssdal: If change is going to come, where is change going to
come from? Duhigg: . . . We live in a time when there’s a brand-new device, it seems like, every
couple of months. And they’re amazing and wonderful – but there’s a price to that.”).
92. Cam Simpson, An iPhone Tester Caught in Apple’s Supply Chain, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-11-07/an-iphonetester-caught-in-apples-supply-chain.
93. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 18.
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under pressure to meet a sudden surge in demand, often around
product launches. 94
For example, when Apple’s marketing chief unveiled the iPhone 5 on
September 12, 2012, few units had been produced. 95 However, the
phone was scheduled to become available for sale in nine different
markets in nine days. 96 Apple’s aggressive “production-and-launch
schedule” meant that its supplier—Flextronics—had to intensify its own
value chain to meet Apple’s scheduling and volume demands. 97
The result of this cost pressure and time pressure is the grueling
environment reported in “sweatshops” around the world, including at
Foxconn’s large contract manufacturing facility near Shenzhen, China.
B.

The Tragedy at Foxconn

Foxconn Technology Group (“Foxconn”) is the world’s leading
contract manufacturer of electronics. 98 Its customers include Apple,
Dell, Sony, and Nokia. 99 However, it is now better known for the series
of suicides that occurred at its facilities in 2010. During 2010, several
workers leapt off buildings at Foxconn’s site near Shenzhen. 100 This
Foxconn facility is possibly the world’s largest production facility with
over 300,000 workers. 101 The facilities that Foxconn maintains in China
are not like average production sites. Its workers eat and sleep at these
facilities. This business model of taking over the lives of the workers is
not unusual and is instead the usual practice for many of China’s lowcost manufacturers. 102 Due to features of Chinese law, migrant workers
are at the mercy of their employers, and not the government, for housing
and services. Citizenship in China is linked to birthplace and so the local
governments in the manufacturing districts in China often deny needed
94. M.B., Apple and Foxconn: iAudit, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 30, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/03/apple-and-foxconn.
95. Simpson, supra note 92.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Pun Ngai & Jenny Chan, Global Capital, the State, and Chinese Workers: The Foxconn
Experience, 38 MODERN CHINA 383, 385–86 (2012).
99. Kathrin Hille, Suicides Put Foxconn Model Under Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES (May 23, 2010),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a4d15856-66ca-11df-aeb1-00144feab49a.html#axzz2jsMkzDbI.
100. Jason Dean & Ting-I Tsai, Suicides Spark Inquiries, WALL STREET J. (May 27, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704026204575267603576594936.
101. Hille, supra note 99.
102. Richard Appelbaum & Nelson Lichtenstein, A New World of Retail Supremacy: Supply
Chains and Workers’ Chains in the Age of Wal-Mart, 70 INT’L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 106,
110 (2006).
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services to the migrant workers. 103 Therefore, migrant workers are
dependent upon their employers for housing and that is why large
dormitories are often situated adjacent to working facilities in these
areas. 104 Of course, this dynamic only exacerbates the power of the
factory owners and managers, who resort to tactics such as withholding a
worker’s identity papers until the worker fulfills the contract with the
employer. 105
One contributing factor to Foxconn worker exhaustion was Foxconn’s
drive to deliver orders in short delivery times. 106 The quick turn-around
was part of Foxconn’s strategy to compete and claim business away
from its more established competitors. 107 It was also an adaptation to the
production schedules demanded by their customers—including Apple
and Nokia—who wanted their products quickly in order to satisfy global
demand for their products: “The corporations pressure Foxconn so that
they can compete against each other on price, quality, and delivery. To
fulfill the requirement of speedy production and shipment deadlines,
Foxconn transfers the work pressure to the frontline workers.” 108 The
Longhua factory could produce more than ninety iPhones per minute.109
These production feats were achieved due to conditions like the
following: “Management used stop-watches and computerized industrial
engineering devices to test the capacity of the workers and if workers
being tested were able to meet the quota, the target would be increased
day by day until the capacity of the workers reached the maximum.” 110
Unfortunately, this also had the effect of pushing its workers to and past
their breaking point.
In the wake of public scrutiny, Apple joined the Fair Labor
Association (FLA) in 2012 and promised to align its compliance
program with FLA obligations. 111 Apple also terminated its relationship
with a supplier that employed underage workers in violation of Apple’s
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Ngai & Chan, supra note 98, at 388.
107. Id. at 387, 400.
108. Id. at 400.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Apple Joins FLA, FAIR LAB. ASS’N (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.fairlabor.org/blog/entry/
apple-joins-fla. The FLA conducted an independent investigation of Foxconn’s facilities in China
and reported a completion rate of approximately ninety-nine percent on remediation items. Final
Foxconn Verification Status Report, FAIR LAB. ASS’N (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.fairlabor.org/
report/final-foxconn-verification-status-report.
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code of conduct. 112 In 2013, Apple even decided to break Foxconn’s
monopoly over iPhone assembly and include a different supplier,
Pegatron Corp., more prominently in its value chain. 113 Apple’s reasons
for doing so were at least partially informed by pricing decisions. Public
scrutiny of Foxconn led the supplier to improve working conditions and
therefore reduce its cost advantages from scale.114 Some analysts
speculate that the supplier change may be motivated by Pegatron’s
willingness to accept thinner margins, which will likely lead to
downward pressure on wages and conditions for Pegatron’s workers. 115
Finally, Foxconn decided to change the composition of its assembly-line
workers by including up to 10,000 new robots on its factory floor in
order to meet new iPhone production quotas. 116
II.

IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: TWO COMPETING TALES
OF CAUSATION

Identifying the solutions to problems like Foxconn requires that
stakeholders first understand the problem accurately. There is a
temptation in developed economies—from buyers to politicians to
media—to diagnose tragedies such as Rana Plaza and Foxconn as
consequences of asymmetries of information in the value chain: These
abuses occur because the multinational buyer is often unaware of the
choices and conduct of its overseas supplier. This leads to the familiar
challenge of managing the agency-cost problem in corporate activity.
This implicit or explicit diagnosis of the problem has led to reliance on
monitoring and audits as means of discouraging suppliers from engaging
in human rights abuses, such as the initiatives adopted in California and
Denmark. 117 This diagnosis of the problem is prevalent because it
accords with the buyer’s perspective on value chain abuses: “it’s them,
not us.” Given the relative power of buyer voices over their suppliers, it

112. Connie Guglielmo, Apple’s Supplier Labor Practices in China Scrutinized After Foxconn,
Pegatron Reviews, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2013, 7:15 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
connieguglielmo/2013/12/12/apples-labor-practices-in-china-scrutinized-after-foxconn-pegatronreviewed/.
113. Eva Dou, Apple Shifts Supply Chain Away from Foxconn to Pegatron, WALL STREET J. (May
29, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323855804578511122734340726.

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Michael Coffey, Foxconn May Soon Rely on Robots Over Humans for Apple’s iPhone 6,
MARKET WATCH (July 7, 2014, 12:37 PM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/thetell/2014/07/07/
foxconn-may-soon-rely-on-robots-over-humans-for-apples-iphone-6/.
117. See supra notes 12, 14 and accompanying text.
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is not surprising that the problem is presented as one relating to control
of supplier conduct in the value chain. Section A elaborates on this
viewpoint and explains why the CSR strategies that it inspires will be
unsuccessful.
However, as discussed in Section B, asymmetries of information are
only a part of the problem. From the perspective of the suppliers, they
fall short of human rights standards because of asymmetries in rent and
risk that characterize many value chains: The value gained in the chain is
directed toward the buying end while the risks involved are directed to
the suppliers. This results in a situation where suppliers cannot
simultaneously satisfy the sourcing demands and CSR standards of
buyers. As a consequence, therefore, suppliers will frustrate buyers’
attempts at monitoring and resist efforts at improvement. The solution to
addressing this challenge is not to engage in more auditing. Instead, it
depends on appealing to the interests of the suppliers and incentivizing
them to cooperate.
A.

Explaining Foxconn—The Buyer’s Tale: Asymmetries in
Information

One way to understand the events at Foxconn is to attribute them to
the lack of information that the buyer, Apple, and other stakeholders
have regarding what occurs at overseas sites such as Foxconn. The
danger of this lack of information is that it contributes to the agency-cost
problem that plagues many areas of corporate activity: “The agency cost
problem arises whenever one party (the agent) has discretionary power
to make decisions that affect the wealth of another (the principal).” 118
The challenge is that the “very act of deputizing someone else to run
your affairs raises incentives for suboptimal behavior.” 119
The agency-cost problem also plagues the global value chain. The
chain is based on one party, such as a multinational buyer, contracting
with another firm to perform activity that the buyer previously
performed within its own firm. When it does so, it creates a situation
where the “outsourcing vendor controls the activity, while the
outsourcing firm ‘owns’ the result.” 120 In other words, Apple is in a
situation where Foxconn controls production activities and related
functions—including the treatment of the workers who produce Apple’s
goods—but the backlash against Foxconn’s practices are directed at
118. Geis, supra note 26, at 974.
119. Id. at 973.
120. Id. at 962.
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Apple, who faces the consequences of Foxconn’s choices.
1.

Addressing the Agency-Cost Problem: Monitoring

A significant cause of the agency-cost problem is asymmetrical
information between the agent (supplier) and the principal (multinational
buyer). 121 It is difficult for the principal to adequately protect itself
against the agent’s behavior because the principal may have limited
means to become aware of it.122 It is no surprise, therefore, that one
method that outsourcing firms have adopted to address the agency-cost
problem is to contractually require vendors to subject themselves to
monitoring performed by the outsourcing firm (buyer) or a third party
designated by the outsourcing firm. 123
Some of the most well-known contractual codes of conduct are those
included in supply contracts between a company based in the United
States and its overseas manufacturers. For example, HP’s Supplier
Social & Environmental Responsibility Agreement states that suppliers
are “responsible for identifying any areas of its operations that do not
conform to HP’s Supplier Code of Conduct and HP’s General
Specification for the Environment,” as well as “implementing and
monitoring improvement programs designed to achieve” these
standards. 124 The agreement also gives HP the right to progress reports
and the right to records for verification of the information in the
supplier’s reports. 125
One significant limitation of private codes of conduct is that
downstream firms did not adequately monitor compliance with their own
codes. 126 Ineffective monitoring meant that that there was little
motivation for upstream suppliers to change current practices.
Due to this limitation, public actors attempted to increase the
monitoring and oversight responsibilities of upstream firms towards
their downstream partners. For example, the Securities & Exchange
Commission adopted a rule mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
121. Id. at 974.
122. Id. at 979.
123. Id. at 993.
124. HP Supplier Social and Environmental Responsibility Agreement, HEWLET-PACKARD (Oct.
22, 2008), http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitizenship/environment/pdf/supagree.pdf.
125. Id.
126. In a study of 246 codes, only ten percent had a formal complaint body and less than fifty
percent had any type of penalty or consequence for violation. Mark B. Baker, Promises and
Platitudes: Towards a New 21st Century Paradigm for Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 23 CONN. J.
INT’L L. 123, 133 (2007).
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Reform and Consumer Protection Act that requires firms to “disclose
their use of conflict minerals that originated in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) or an adjoining country.” 127 Examples of such conflict
minerals include gold, tungsten, and tin. 128 If the conflict minerals
originated in the DRC or one of its neighbors, the firm must “undertake
due diligence on the source and chain of custody of its conflict minerals”
and must also file a Conflict Minerals Report. 129 Firms subject to this
rule must not only provide the required information to the SEC but must
also make their disclosures available to the public on their website.130
Another example is the 2012 executive order issued by President
Obama that is intended to prevent human trafficking and forced labor in
federal contracting. 131 Federal contracting regulations will be amended
in order to ban certain “trafficking-related” activities by federal
contractors, subcontractors, and their employees. 132 Examples of
prohibited activities include “misleading or fraudulent recruitment
practices; charging employees recruitment fees; and destroying or
confiscating an employee’s identity documents, such as a passport or a
driver’s license.” 133 Compliance programs are also mandatory for federal
contractors and subcontractors working under larger contracts abroad. 134
Sub-state actors have also been active in attempting to address supply
chain issues. Under the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of
2010,
Every retail seller and manufacturer doing business in this state
and having annual worldwide gross receipts that exceed one
hundred million dollars ($100,000,000) shall disclose, as set
forth in subdivision (c), its efforts to eradicate slavery and
human trafficking from its direct supply chain for tangible goods

127. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rule for Disclosing Use of Conflict
Minerals (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-163.htm
[hereinafter SEC Press Release].
128. Id.
129. Fact Sheet: Disclosing the Use of Conflict Minerals, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1365171562058#.VAd7PGMVM4g.
130. Id.
131. Exec. Order No. 13627, 77 Fed. Reg. 60029 (Sept. 25, 2012).
132. Fact Sheet: Executive Order Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking in Persons in
Federal Contracts, THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Sept. 25, 2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/25/fact-sheet-executive-order-strengtheningprotections-against-trafficking.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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offered for sale. 135
Specifically, firms covered by the law must disclose the extent to which
it (1) verifies product supply chains “to evaluate and address risks of
human trafficking and slavery,” 136 (2) audits suppliers to evaluate
compliance with firm standards regarding trafficking and slavery, 137 (3)
“[r]equires direct suppliers to certify that materials incorporated into the
product comply with the laws regarding slavery and human trafficking
of the country or countries in which they are doing business,” 138 (4)
“[m]aintains internal accountability standards and procedures,” 139 and
(5) trains employees and management on human trafficking and
slavery. 140 These disclosures must be available on the seller or
manufacturer’s website. 141 If the firm does not maintain a website, it
must provide a written disclosure within thirty days of receiving a
written request for disclosure from a consumer. 142
At the international level, the United Nations has also reinforced the
importance of monitoring as a means to address abuses by suppliers in
the value chain. For example, the most recent U.N. effort to combat
corporate misconduct is the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework
proposed by U.N. Special Representative for Business and Human
Rights John Ruggie. 143 Perhaps the most novel contribution of this
framework is the recognition of the “corporate responsibility to respect,”
which requires that companies refrain from infringing on the rights of
others. 144 The foundation of this responsibility is due diligence,
understood as “a process whereby companies not only ensure
compliance with national laws but also manage the risk of human rights
harm with a view to avoiding it.” 145
A company’s responsibility for due diligence includes evaluating: (a)
the “country contexts in which their business activities take place, to
highlight any specific human rights challenges they may pose,” (b)
“human rights impacts their own activities may have within that context
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1) (West 2012).
Id. § 1714.43(c)(1).
Id. § 1714.43(c)(2).
Id. § 1714.43(c)(3).
Id. § 1714.43(c)(4).
Id. § 1714.43(c)(5).
Id. § 1714.43(b).
Id.
Framework, supra note 2, at 9.
Id. at 8.
Id.
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- for example, in their capacity as producers, service providers,
employers, and neighbours,” and (c) “whether they might contribute to
abuse through the relationships connected to their activities, such as with
business partners, suppliers, State agencies, and other non-State
actors.” 146 According to the “Ruggie Framework,” appropriate due
diligence should include formulating a firm-specific human rights
policy, impact assessments, integration of the human rights policy
throughout the firm, and tracking performance through monitoring and
auditing. 147
The overarching theme of these diverse efforts is to increase the due
diligence responsibilities of downstream firms regarding their sourcing
practices. 148
2.

The Limits of Monitoring: Resistance and Tension Along
the Value Chain

The problem with the monitoring efforts described above is that they
do not overcome the problem of asymmetric information that
characterizes the agency-cost problem. This is because upstream
suppliers engage in a variety of practices that undermine the
effectiveness of oversight by downstream buyers.
First, many workers do not know what is being evaluated when social
auditors inspect the sites. In one study, although eighty percent of
respondents knew of external auditor inspections, a very small number
knew that the purpose of the auditor’s visits was to evaluate labor
standards and work conditions. 149 The rest did not know the purpose or
believed that the audits were related to production safety and quality. 150
Managers themselves may be unaware of the objectives of factory audits
or the benefits of improved conditions and this lack of awareness
reduces the likelihood that they will be willing to invest in change.151
Second, upstream suppliers manipulate the auditing process, thereby

146. Id. at 17.
147. Id. at 18.
148. Marcia Narine, From Kansas to the Congo: Why Naming and Shaming Corporations
Through the Dodd-Frank Act’s Corporate Governance Disclosure Won’t Solve a Human Rights
Crisis, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 351, 371 (2012).
149. Anita Chan & Kaxton Siu, Wal-Mart’s CSR and Labor Standards in China 20 (The Int’l
Research Network on Bus., Dev. & Soc’y, Working Paper No. 4, 2009), available at
http://bdsnetwork.cbs.dk/publications/Working%20Papers/bsd_working_paper_(paper4).pdf.
150. Id.
151. Daniella Gould, The Problem with Supplier Audits: Understanding How and Why Chinese
Factories Circumvent Codes of Conduct, 2 CORP. RESP. MGMT. 24, 25–26 (2005).
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giving a false appearance of compliance. A social audit occurs when a
firm submits its corporate accountability standards to verification. The
auditors use a combination of interviews, document review, and visual
inspection in order to evaluate the firm’s compliance with its own
standards. 152 One concern with private codes is that downstream firms
do not actually monitor compliance with their codes, leading to
continued violations and little incentive for change. 153
A number of the world’s most prominent brand names now proudly
advertise the fact that they regularly audit their suppliers. However, this
increased monitoring function may not actually identify violations or
improve conditions. The following story from Bangladesh illustrates
some of the limitations of external monitoring. Walmart and JC Penney
were among several companies that were criticized for their use of child
laborers in a Bangladesh factory known as Harvest Rich. 154 Some of the
children used in this factory were as young as eleven years old and were
routinely assaulted and forced to work shifts exceeding twelve hours. 155
Even more unfortunate than the conditions at Harvest Rich was the fact
that the factory had been inspected. In fact, not only was Harvest Rich
inspected but it had been certified by the Worldwide Responsible
Apparel Production Group (WRAP). 156 A WRAP certification signifies
that the factory is “in ‘full compliance’ with all human and worker rights
laws and international standards.” 157 So, how did WRAP miss the fact
that 200–300 children were exploited at the factory, including routine
beatings and substandard pay? In the words of one of the young girls
who worked at Harvest Rich: “‘When buyers come, we [the child
workers] are kept in the bathroom.’ They make us hide ‘because we are
little, because we are kids.’” 158
Upstream suppliers are able to manipulate the auditing process for a
number of reasons. Audits are often announced in advance and this
provides local owners and managers with time to give the appearance of
compliance to the visiting auditors. 159 Higher quality social audits can

152. Sasha Courville, Social Accountability Audits: Challenging or Defending Democratic
Governance?, 25 L. & POL’Y 269, 273 (2003).
153. Baker, supra note 126, at 133–34.
154. KERNAGAHN, supra note 14, at 1.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 37.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 12.
159. Gould, supra note 151, at 28; Peter Lund-Thomsen, The Global Sourcing and Codes of
Conduct Debate: Five Myths and Five Recommendations, 39 DEV. & CHANGE 1005, 1013 (2008).
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also be time intensive, involving interviews with several varieties of
stakeholders (management, workers, worker representatives, health and
safety officers). 160 The preference of some workers for off-site
interviews also increases the time required for audits. 161 Despite this
need for time, auditors may only stay for periods of time short enough
for managers to maintain the façade. 162 Some suppliers even erect walls
to hide non-compliance or ensure that production occurs off-site at
facilities that will not be inspected. 163
Local management also controls communication between workers
and social auditors by prohibiting open conversation, selecting which
workers will provide information, and even coaching workers in their
answers. 164 A prevalent “management-bias” in the industry ensures that
most information is obtained from managers as opposed to their
workers. 165 Double book keeping also prevents auditors from making an
accurate assessment because they only receive the set of records that
local management wants them to see. 166 Suppliers keep false sets of
records and logs to “hide evidence of actual excessive overtime,
improper payment of wages, and otherwise adverse working
conditions.” 167 Additionally, suppliers have improved their ability to
maintain duplicitous practices and are further assisted by professional
consultants who advise on such deception. 168

160. Courville, supra note 152, at 276.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Erica L. Plambeck & Terry A. Taylor, Supplier Evasion of a Buyer’s Audit: Implications for
Auditing and Compliance with Labor and Environmental Standards 3 (Draft Working Paper, 2014).
164. Chan & Siu, supra note 149, at 5; Ngai-Ling Sum & Pun Ngai, Globalization and
Paradoxes of Ethical Transnational Production: Code of Conduct in a Chinese Workplace, 9
Competition & Change 181, 194 (2005); Plambeck & Taylor, supra note 163, at 3; see also
Timothy Bartley, Standards for Sweatshops: The Power and Limits of Club Theory for Explaining
Voluntary Labor Standards Programs, in 110 VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A CLUB THEORY
APPROACH 128 (Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash eds., 2009).
165. Barrientos & Smith, supra note 16, at 716; Courville, supra note 152, at 275.
166. Barrientos, supra note 83, at 980; Michael E. Blowfield & Catherine S. Dolan, Stewards of
Virtue? The Ethical Dilemma of CSR in African Agriculture, 39 DEV. & CHANGE 1, 13–14 (2008);
Bin Jiang, Implementing Supplier Codes of Conduct in Global Supply Chains: Process Explanations
from Theoretic and Empirical Perspectives, 85 J. BUS. ETHICS 77, 88 (2008).
167. Dexter Roberts et al., Secrets, Lies, and Sweatshops, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 26,
2006), available at http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-11-26/secrets-lies-and-sweatshops
(according to one compliance manager, “the percentage of Chinese suppliers caught submitting
false payroll records has risen from 46% to 75% in the past four years” and “estimates that only
20% of Chinese suppliers comply with wage rules, while just 5% obey hour limitations”); Plambeck
& Taylor, supra note 163, at 3.
168. Gould, supra note 151, at 25, 27–28; Plambeck & Taylor, supra note 163, at 3; Roberts et
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The result is that “an imperative for transparency and accountability
can instead produce secrecy and deception.” 169 Auditing issues are
further compounded when auditors are not trained in the necessary skills
for social auditing or do not even speak the same language as the
workers at the audited factories. 170 Increasing the costs of deceptive
behavior can be an important improvement, but the result may just be
that suppliers ultimately fail the audit if they cannot hide their violations.
Failing an audit exposes them to the risk of termination, which results in
a situation where the workers who were previously exploited are now
unemployed. Furthermore, the risk of termination, and the economic
results for workers, can result in a problematic alliance between
management and workers to present an appearance of compliance with
corporate codes. 171 Such a situation makes it even more difficult for the
lead firm and external auditors to determine the situation on the ground.
Third, suppliers often turn to workers who enjoy little to no protection
under national laws or corporate standards. 172 In order to contend with
downward pricing and increasingly fluctuating demand for products,
contract manufacturers have tended to employ women, minorities, and
migrant labor because individuals from these groups are less likely or
able to assert their rights. 173 Contract manufacturers have also turned to
contract labor in order to reduce overhead and to hire and fire as needed
based on demand. 174 Contract laborers receive far less protection from
public actors (national employment legislation) and private actors
(corporate codes of conduct). 175 The conditions of contract laborers
escape the notice of social auditors because of the short duration of the
auditor visits, unfamiliarity with local employment practices, and a
failure to consult with contract labor.176
al., supra note 167.
169. Blowfield & Dolan, supra note 166, at 14.
170. Id.; Courville, supra note 152, at 276.
171. Sum & Ngai, supra note 164, at 197–98; Plambeck & Taylor, supra note 163, at 3.
172. Stephanie Barrientos & Andrienetta Kritzinger, Squaring the Circle: Global Production and
the Informalization of Work in South African Fruit Exports, 16 J. INT’L DEV. 81, 85 (2004).
173. See Barrientos & Smith, supra note 16, at 722–23; Locke et al., supra note 76, at 526; Ngai
& Chan, supra note 98, at 386 (“As migrant workers, Foxconn workers enjoy little labor protection
in the society at large and suffer from a heightened work pressure and desperation in the workplace
that lead to suicides on the one hand but also daily and collective resistance on the other hand.”).
174. Locke et al., supra note 76, at 526.
175. Blowfield & Dolan, supra note 166, at 6–7; see also Barrientos, supra note 83, at 982–83;
Locke et al., supra note 76, at 532 (explaining how many national laws do not protect contract
laborers and, consequently, how suppliers structure their employment practices to prevent workers
from becoming full-time).
176. Barrientos, supra note 83, at 980.
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Contract laborers are less likely to assert their rights because they are
often staffed from different agencies, rendering it more difficult for
union organizers to coordinate the efforts of these workers. 177 Thus,
although a corporate code may proclaim a lead firm’s commitment to
freedom of association, the increasing majority of that firm’s workforce
is not entitled to that right or cannot effectively exercise it. Contract
laborers are also less likely to organize given that they can be easily
terminated because of the short-term and contractual nature of their
employment. 178 As supplier workforces are concentrated outside the
supplier and in temporary staffing agencies, it becomes important to
include these agencies in the CSR compliance monitoring. However,
there is a risk that downstream suppliers will either not supply the
agencies staffing their production lines with compliance codes or will
not ensure that the agencies conform to the codes. 179 A number of local
governments in China have also taken to dispatching students to “intern”
at Foxconn factories. 180 This pool of labor “has become an enormous
worker community in Foxconn factories across the country.” 181 By
formatting this working arrangement as an internship (and not
employment), the students are not protected under China’s Labor Law,
not entitled to trade union membership, and any resulting disputes are
not treated as labor disputes. 182
It is important to remember that a number of corporate codes of
conduct take national laws as their substantive standard and simply
require that their suppliers adhere to those laws in their operation. This
results in a double-negative effect when workers—such as students—do
not fall within the protection of those national laws. When these workers
fall outside the protection of the law, private codes simply reinforce this
exclusion.
Although this Article focuses on the limitations of monitoring caused
by resistance from upstream suppliers, the auditing model has been
criticized for other weaknesses as well. One concern is that auditing—as
a form of “regulation by numbers”—prioritizes a quantitative approach
to public values that may be inappropriate for social issues such as
177. Locke et al., supra note 76, at 526.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 534.
180. Lance Whitney, Apple’s Chinese Suppliers Still Exploiting Workers, Says Report,
CBSNEWS.COM (Feb. 27, 2013, 11:48 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/apples-chinesesuppliers-still-exploiting-workers-says-report/.
181. Ngai & Chan, supra note 98, at 391.
182. Id.
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human rights. This is because of a risk that indicators may lead to better
performance on issues that are easier to quantify, thereby neglecting
other equally significant issues because of the difficulties involved in
measuring the latter. 183 Secondly, the use of indicators encourages a
“box-ticking” approach to compliance that leads to a prioritization of the
number of disclosures as opposed to their accuracy or role in promoting
actual improvement. 184 Finally, there are concerns regarding the quality
and conflict of interests of many of the firms performing auditing
services. 185
B.

Explaining Foxconn—The Supplier’s Tale: Asymmetries in Rent
and Risk

As the previous section explained, increasing the number of audits
does not reduce the number of tragedies. After all, Apple increased the
number of facilities it audited between 2007 and 2010 from thirty-nine
to 102, 186 but this rise did not prevent the series of suicides that occurred
in 2010. The reason that monitoring efforts oftentimes have limited
success is because the asymmetrical flow of information is only a partial
explanation of events such as the suicides at Foxconn. Instead, human
rights abuses at overseas sites are also explained as a result of
asymmetrical flows in rent and risks that are not addressed by
monitoring efforts. This is why the current wave of corporate social
responsibility reforms—heavily based on increased monitoring and due
diligence—will have a limited impact on the lives of overseas workers.
1.

Caught in the Middle: The Tension Between Corporate Social
Responsibility Policies and Procurement Practices

The tenth suicide at Foxconn in 2010 occurred days before Apple’s
global launch of its iPad to countries other than the United States.187
Apple’s response was to reaffirm its “commit[ment] to ensuring that
conditions throughout our supply chain are safe and workers are treated

183. Galit A. Sarfaty, Regulating Through Numbers: A Case Study of Corporate Sustainability
Reporting, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 575, 611 (2013).
184. Id. at 581, 606–08.
185. Id. at 610.
186. Business: Core and Periphery; Supply Chains in China, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2010, at 83.
187. Workers Urged Not to Kill Themselves; Asked to Sign Contracts with Promise, WINDSOR
STAR
(May
27,
2010),
http://www2.canada.com/windsorstar/news/story.html?
id=19fffdd5-40ee-4b51-9dfb-04fe8d083ab4.
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with respect and dignity.” 188 The problem is the tension between this
professed commitment and the business model that Apple adopts. Apple
relies on a “lean and flexible” supply chain. 189 This results in more
production per worker being required on a fluctuating timeline. As a
consequence, “suppliers often try to cut corners, replace expensive
chemicals with less costly alternatives, or push their employees to work
faster and longer.” 190According to an executive whose company assisted
with bringing the Apple iPad to market, “[t]he only way you make
money working for Apple is figuring out how to do things more
efficiently or cheaper.” 191 But the problem for the suppliers, according to
the same executive, is that Apple will “come back the next year, and
force a 10 percent price cut.” 192 Much of supplier resistance, therefore, is
fueled by the inability of upstream suppliers to meet the purchasing
demands of multinational buyers while also adhering to the CSR
practices espoused by these same buyers. According to a former Apple
executive, “You can set all the rules you want, but they’re meaningless if
you don’t give suppliers enough profit to treat workers well . . . . If you
squeeze margins, you’re forcing them to cut safety.” 193
The value chain is skewed in favor of Apple and other multinational
buyers so that the benefits of the arrangement accrue to one end—in the
developed economies—while the risks are relegated to the other end.194
After all, Apple secured significant profits from its product launch of the
iPhone in 2007. These profits were helped by the mystery that shrouded
the iPhone prior to its launch and the significant scale-up that allowed

188. Id.
189. Stephen Foley, Apple Admits It Has a Human Rights Problem, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 14,
2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/apple-admits-it-has-a-human-rights-problem6898617.html.
190. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 18.
191. Id.
192. Id.; see also Bartley, supra note 164, at 127–28 (discussing similar issues in the apparel
industry); Xiaomin Yu, Impacts of Corporate Code of Conduct on Labor Standards: A Case Study
of Reebok’s Athletic Footwear Supplier Factory in China, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 513, 523 (2007)
(discussing similar issues with Reebok’s procurement practices).
193. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 18.
194. See, e.g., Barrientos, supra note 83, at 982 (“Suppliers are thus caught in a Catch 22
situation, where they have to deliver on quality (and associated value) which is passed up the value
chain, whilst cost and risk is being passed down the chain. These risks and costs are often passed
down to workers—particularly casual and contract labour who are the weakest link in the chain.”);
Barrientos & Kritzinger, supra note 172, at 83 (“Hence, within global value chains, risk and
uncertainty are passed downwards, whilst economic rents are passed upwards. This has important
implications for labour.”); Suk-Jun Lim & Joe Phillips, Embedding CSR Values: The Global
Footwear Industry’s Evolving Governance Structure, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 143, 144 (2008).
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Apple to meet consumer demand for the products. 195
But this marketing technique has a price. It was obtained because
hundreds of Chinese workers staffed assembly lines in long shifts. The
pay-off for this strategy was not evenly distributed as the lion’s share of
the value from the chain was secured by Apple. 196 However, the risks
associated with this marketing strategy—meeting a large volume of
orders in a short time period while meeting quality standards—were
borne by overseas suppliers and their assembly line workers.
Instantaneous communications between retailer buyers and their
suppliers mean that the former pressure the latter to meet fluctuating and
demanding production and shipping schedules. In the words of one of
the managers at a Dongguan company, “We are forced to apply the labor
codes . . . but we can judge from our intuition that when production and
codes clash, which side we can cling to.” 197 One reporter commenting on
another tragedy—this one at Rana Plaza in Bangladesh—diagnosed the
problem aptly: “Every player has motives to look the other way. The
retailers ignore the subcontracting because they would rather manage
fewer big contracts, and the per-piece price of garments falls with bigger
orders. Suppliers don’t turn down giant orders because they fear they
will be shut out of future jobs.” 198 This is the tension in the global value
chain that leads to the forms of supplier resistance discussed above and
that jeopardizes corporate social responsibility objectives.
The gains from fragmentation have not been shared equally among all
the actors who participate in global value chains. The prospect of lower
costs, greater responsiveness to demand, and short production schedules
are some of the key attractions of fragmentation for multinational buying
firms such as Apple. However, these same characteristics extract a high
cost from the workers who labor at the other end of the value chain.
Significant downward pressure on pricing decreases the margins that
upstream suppliers can recover, leading them to pay their workers less
and work them more. According to one critic, voluntary codes of
conduct “involve[] a tension between buyers and retailers
simultaneously striving to maximize the value they extract from the
195. See Charles Duhigg & Keith Bradsher, How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 2012, at A1.
196. See Slicing an Apple, supra note 38; Dedrick et al., supra note 63.
197. Appelbaum & Lichtenstein, supra note 102, at 120.
198. Vikas Bajaj, Doing Business in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/opinion/sunday/doing-business-in-bangladesh.html; see also
Lim & Phillips, supra note 194, at 148 (“As long as Nike used purely economic standards for
selecting and maintaining supplier relationships, the resulting fragile buyer–manufacturer link
would not support the CSR goals.”).
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chain, whilst selling competitively priced goods that meet high
specifications in relation to both product and social standards.” 199 This
reluctance to absorb the cost of compliance means that upstream
suppliers will be the ones who will ultimately pay for improving
conditions. 200 Given that a number of them already find it difficult to
secure a satisfactory profit margin, it is unlikely that they will cut further
into their margin by investing in CSR. Instead, they will more likely
continue to find loopholes in existing initiatives and maintain current
practices or they will fail their audits, exposing themselves and their
workers to unemployment.
2.

Addressing Asymmetries in Rent and Risk

A significant reason for the limitations of monitoring and disclosure
efforts is that they are intended to address asymmetries in information
but not to ameliorate the asymmetries in rent and risk discussed above.
The failure to address this latter category of asymmetries encourages
suppliers to frustrate attempts at auditing and other efforts to address
asymmetries of information. The end result is that practices do not
change.
It is important for public actors to recognize the different varieties of
asymmetries that characterize the global value chain. This is because the
identified asymmetries give rise to the solutions that these public actors
adopt to reform the value chain. Disproportionate attention to only one
type—asymmetries of information—has led California and other
jurisdictions to encourage increased monitoring through audits.
Unfortunately, given the dynamics of value chain discussed above, these
steps will not necessarily increase the buyer’s access to accurate
information or improve the supplier’s actual practices.
In order to improve conditions in the value chain, public and other
actors must address asymmetries in information as well as asymmetries
in rent and risk. The shift in focus from the former to the latter signifies
a parallel shift from auditing suppliers to engaging suppliers by creating
incentives for cooperation. After all, incentives are another way to
address asymmetries of information and ameliorate the resulting agencycost problem. 201 Although not the exclusive type of incentive, the most

199. Barrientos, supra note 83, at 981–82; see also Miller, supra note 8, at 41–42.
200. Sum & Ngai, supra note 164, at 195.
201. Geis, supra note 26, at 991 (“A third strategy for mitigating outsourcing agency risk is to set
a compensation scheme that seeks to align vendors’ economic interests with those of the
principal.”).
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effective incentives may be the ones that enable suppliers to comply
with CSR standards and reward them for doing so. 202
The incorporation of supplier incentives will likely determine the
success of CSR initiatives adopted. For example, in the wake of the
tragedy at Rana Plaza, two different CSR initiatives were adopted: the
Bangladesh Accords and the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety.
The Accords were created by apparel companies, NGOs, and labor
unions in order to improve fire and building safety in the Bangladeshi
garment industry. What is distinctive about the Accords is the role of the
apparel company in achieving the Accords’ objectives. Specifically, the
Accords contains a section entitled “Supplier Incentives” that contains
both sticks and carrots that apparel companies should use in order to
cajole their suppliers into compliance. 203
For example, the Accords require that apparel companies finance the
cost of improved standards in their production sites, although they are
given latitude in designing the precise form of financing. 204 This is an
important step because it reduces the temptation for suppliers to cheat if
the apparel companies are “ensur[ing] that it is financially feasible for
the factories to maintain safe workplaces” 205 and helping to finance the
upgrading and remediation process. Additionally, under Article 24,
signatory firms also financially contribute to the Accords’ programs. 206
However, under the Accords, apparel companies do not only share costs
with their suppliers. Governance of this program is shared between
representatives of the signatory firms and signatory unions, and
capacity-building is also a shared responsibility. The Accords also
include important changes in sourcing practices. Signatory companies
commit to source at least sixty-five percent of their production volume
202. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 18 (reporting that Hewlett Packard “allowed [suppliers]
slightly more profits and other allowances if they were used to improve worker conditions”); see
also Yu, supra note 192, at 526.
203. ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH 6 (May 13, 2013),
http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/the_accord.pdf [hereinafter BANGLADESH
ACCORD].
204. Id. (“In order to induce Tier 1 and Tier 2 factories to comply with upgrade and remediation
requirements of the program, participating brands and retailers will negotiate commercial terms
with their suppliers which ensure that it is financially feasible for the factories to maintain safe
workplaces and comply with upgrade and remediation requirements instituted by the Safety
Inspector. Each signatory company may, at its option, use alternative means to ensure factories have
the financial capacity to comply with remediation requirements, including but not limited to joint
investments, providing loans, accessing donor or government support, through offering business
incentives or through paying for renovations directly.” (emphasis added)).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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from Tier 1 or Tier 2 firms, which are firms characterized by significant
orders and long-term supply relationships. 207 Finally, Article 23 helps to
prevent flight by retailers in response to improved standards and
increased costs. 208
However, many firms—mostly American—have opted for another
route for addressing the tragedy at Rana Plaza. The Alliance for
Bangladesh Worker Safety began with a group of North American
brands and retailers who also wanted to improve conditions in the
garment industry in Bangladesh. Initially, the Alliance’s approach
appears very similar to the approach taken under the Accords. Although
the Alliance’s plan includes some commitments to improving training
and provision of funding, it appears to replicate more of the same by
relying on auditing and verification. Unlike the Accords, the Alliance
approach does not provide the same opportunities for worker
representation and it is not binding. 209 Additionally, under the Accords,
brand firms will guarantee the availability of funds for upgrading unsafe
factories. 210 By contrast, even if loans are made available under the
Alliance, “there is no obligation to create commercial terms that would
allow factory owners to repay.” 211 The key differences between the two
approaches, therefore, concern the types of incentives that each offers
the Bangladeshi suppliers to change their practices and improve safety
conditions. The Accords partner suppliers and buyers regarding
governance, capacity-building, financing, and sourcing behavior and
therefore necessitate changes in behavior at both ends of the global value
chain.
The Alliance appears to favor a top-down approach applied by the
buyers that does not seem to resolve tension points in the global value
chain that led to crises like Rana Plaza. In other words, it has not offered
key incentives to suppliers in order to get them to cooperate.
III. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM: DIMENSIONS OF
DECENTRALIZATION
The fragmented firm poses two important challenges for public actors

207. Id. at 1–2 (Articles 1–3).
208. Id. at 6.
209. Walmart/Gap Bangladesh Safety Plan: Pale Imitation of Accord, INDUS. GLOBAL UNION
(Jul. 10, 2013), http://www.industriall-union.org/walmart-gap-bangladesh-safety-plan-paleimitation-of-accord.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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and other stakeholders who are concerned about labor standards in
globalized value chains. The first challenge involves identifying the
relevant actors and designing incentives that are effective for securing
their compliance with the desired labor standards. As explained in
Section I, many of the drawbacks to the current CSR initiatives is that
these approaches are based on the view that the buying end of the value
chain contains the only key actors. 212 That is why many of the incentives
are targeted towards actors who have the profile of a large, multinational
retailer or brand name. The neglect of other actors in the value chain,
therefore, reinforces a belief in the unitary nature of the firm without
acknowledging its fragmented, dispersed, and conflicted characteristics.
In order to be effective, public actors must resist the urge to offer
incentives to only one type of actor in the value chain (unitary model of
firm) and instead design incentives for the diverse range of actors
actually operating in the value chain (fragmented model of firm). As
explained above, the most effective incentives for suppliers are those
that alleviate asymmetries in rent and risk. 213
The second challenge relates to how incentives are transmitted in the
value chain. One reason that California targeted its legislation to
multinational buyers is because it is easier for California to regulate
directly those actors found in its jurisdiction. It is far more difficult for it
to reach actors located across borders due to limitations relating to
jurisdiction, information, legitimacy, and capacity. Therefore, it is
important that California and other stakeholders organize their activities
into a form of governance that will allow them to transmit incentives to
key actors in the value chain, even if they are located far away. This
would allow stakeholders to aggregate their leverage by expanding the
toolkit of incentives that they can offer collectively. This objective
requires that California, Denmark, and other public actors substitute the
traditional state-dominated forms of regulation (command and control)
for a decentralized approach that involves a diversity of stakeholders
(reflexive law). Figure 1 below provides an illustration of these two
dimensions.

212. See supra notes 118–84 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 201–11 and accompanying text.
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Figure 1: Dimensions of Decentralization
The Section below describes the importance of decentralization along
both of these dimensions. Lack of decentralization along the incentive
dimension results in a situation where the incentives produced are
appropriate for only one segment of the value chain. Part A below
outlines a number of these incentives that are more appropriate for
securing supplier cooperation.
However, designing supplier incentives will be ineffective if these
incentives are still transmitted under a traditional approach to regulation:
command and control. Decentralized incentives require a decentralized
approach to governance as well. This requires a form of regulation that
involves a variety of stakeholders instead of the lead of one actor, such
as the state. Section B explores the limitation of command and control
regulation to transmit “decentralized” incentives. It also explains the
limitation of current approaches to multi-stakeholder coordination that
relies on networks. It concludes by advocating for governance using a
reflexive law approach to coordination.
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Incentives Dimension: Designing Incentives for the Fragmented
Firm

Current approaches to improving CSR are limited by the failure of
those approaches to offer the types of incentives that can win supplier
cooperation. This is because these efforts do not adequately distinguish
between the interests of upstream and downstream firms in the value
chain. These approaches assume a harmony of interests between the two
ends of the value chain and neglect points of tension. It is this tension,
however, that leads to resistance from the lower-tiers of the value chain
to CSR initiatives. Such resistance can take several forms, including
supplier manipulation of the auditing process, reliance on contract labor,
and continued violations in overseas facilities. These result in the
limitations to current CSR initiatives that rely on disclosures and
monitoring.
In order to effectively reform the global value chain, public actors
must stop assuming that the only relevant interests are those of a
downstream firm. Such assumptions produce CSR initiatives that
primarily address the interests and cost-benefit calculations of a
downstream buyer but have limited relevance for upstream suppliers. 214
Reputational damage, for example, is a powerful driver for brand name
buyers but not for unknown suppliers who do not sell directly to a broad
consumer base. This distinction is important because, as influential as
downstream firms may be in the global value chain, they are unable or
unwilling to secure compliance without the “buy-in” of suppliers. 215
Reform of the global value chain therefore requires acknowledging the
full spectrum of interests involved and designing incentives that speak to
the various segments of the value chain.
1.

Sanctioning Audit Manipulation

Overseas factory managers and other local actors are in the best
position to determine the accuracy of the monitoring of labor practices.
Unfortunately, they currently have a strong incentive to provide positive,
but inaccurate, representations in order to retain an American firm’s
business without having to actually alter their operations. 216 One
approach to discouraging this form of supplier behavior, therefore, is to
increase the cost of these activities. The nature of the costs involved may
214. See supra notes 118–84 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 146–84 and accompanying text.
216. See Plambeck & Taylor, supra note 163, at 2–3.
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vary but the idea is to increase costs so that suppliers shift resources
from hiding to compliance. 217 Public actors can also encourage firms to
increase both the quantity and quality of their monitoring activities.
Mandatory social reporting does not accomplish much if the information
gathered is inaccurate. Notified of the risks of audit evasion, public
actors should now ensure that firms guard themselves against these risks
in their monitoring activities.
The problem with imposing costs on upstream suppliers is that
although it may discourage audit manipulation, it will not improve
conditions. In other words, reducing audit manipulation is an
intermediate goal but is not the ultimate objective for those who want to
improve conditions in global value chains. Removing audit manipulation
will not accomplish the ultimate objective of reducing the risk of labor
violations. The reason relates to the asymmetry of risk and rent that was
discussed in Section II.B. 218 Current global value chains are generally
skewed in favor of downstream buyers, who extract a disproportionately
greater share of the benefits of the value chain while offloading a
disproportionately large share of the risk to the upstream suppliers. 219
A study commissioned by the World Bank found that many suppliers
distrust the motivations of buyers because of this tension between
corporate codes of conduct they promote and the substantial pressure
that suppliers experience to lower prices and increase turnaround
times. 220 The study found that many supplier complaints “stem from an
overall sense of powerlessness that is underpinned by a perception that
suppliers are asked to shoulder the costs of compliance, whereas buyers
receive the benefits.” 221 This tension between the twin goals presented
by buyers leads to mistrust by suppliers and decreases their likelihood
for cooperation. Increased auditing may even compound this mistrust
217. Id. at 21.
218. See supra notes 197–209 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 197–209 and accompanying text.
220. HELLE BANK JØRGENSON ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, STRENGTHENING IMPLEMENTATION
OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS (2003), available at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/12/19/
000090341_20051219093957/Rendered/PDF/346640Strengthening1Implementation.pdf
[hereinafter Strengthening Implementation].
221. Id. at 25; Barrientos & Smith, supra note 16, at 725–26; Lund-Thomsen & Nadvi, supra
note 31, at 204; Chan & Siu, supra note 149 (“In the latter half of the 1990s, as Wal-Mart sourced
more and more from China, doubling its imports between 1997 and 2002 . . . it became one of the
engines that drove down prices, and in turn migrant wages in the export sector. The price pressure
on other MNCs was so great that, by quickly following suit, they plunged Chinese suppliers into an
intense competition among themselves to acquire orders by squeezing as much out of Chinese
workers as they possibly could.” (citations omitted)).
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because it sends external signals to suppliers regarding the buyer’s lack
of trust in them. 222
The slim profit margins of upstream suppliers and the high
competition among them means that there are not enough resources at
the upstream end of the supply chain to implement the types of changes
that Western consumers and their governments demand. Improving
conditions requires money and the cost of this implementation is often
imposed on upstream suppliers (except for the cost of the auditing
process). Given slim profit margins, upstream suppliers opt to provide
the appearance of compliance rather than invest in actual compliance
because many claim that they cannot afford to do otherwise.
Sanctioning, therefore, will have limited effect. It may improve
transparency and the effectiveness of monitoring; however, removing
audit manipulation may reveal only grim results from genuine audits as
suppliers cannot afford to conform to the codes imposed by
multinational buyers. In such a situation, a supplier will repeatedly fail
the audits and likely be subject to termination. Termination is a
problematic outcome because it negatively affects the welfare of the
workers and, as a result, may incentivize them to hide the true conditions
at the overseas sites. 223
If change is to occur, therefore, the costs of compliance cannot be
relegated to the upstream end of the supply network. Instead, they must
be transmitted downstream. Imposing costs on audit manipulation will
depend on the relative skill and expertise of the monitor compared to the
supplier. Suppliers—situated in the territory and social, political, and
cultural context of the facility and workers—may be better at hiding
their infractions than external monitors are at discovering these
infractions. Additionally, auditing is still an infrequent phenomenon.
Even if a facility is audited several times annually, who is watching on
all of the other days of the year? The increased quality demands on
auditing due to audit manipulation may increase the costs of auditing
and result in even less frequent audits. Therefore, a better way to
incentivize suppliers to improve the global value chain is by taking away
their incentive to cheat by giving them a feasible path to compliance.
Such a path is not offered under the current approach of auditing
suppliers and threatening sanctions for infractions; instead, it depends on
offering suppliers benefits for cooperation.

222. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1809 (2000).
223. See Sum & Ngai, supra note 164, at 198.
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Suppliers claim that there is a strong tension between the stated goals
of buyers regarding improvement and their sourcing practices in favor of
ever decreasing prices, shorter lead times, and temporary contracts. For
example, local factory owners in Bangladesh report that they resort to
unauthorized subcontracting by smaller, uninspected factories in order to
meet the rapid turnaround of large volume orders by large retailers, such
as Walmart. 224 Unauthorized subcontracting appears to be a prevalent
practice in Bangladesh and is a “primary reason safety guidelines that
apply to bigger contractors have not prevented the hundreds of worker
deaths in fires and building collapses in facilities like Rana Plaza.” 225
In order for suppliers to implement better practices, suppliers need to
overcome these asymmetries by transmitting the cost of compliance
downstream to the multinational buyer. Given the considerable costs and
issues associated with auditing, a more reliable path forward is to
incentivize cooperation from upstream suppliers so that they adhere to
better practices even without the looming threat of monitoring and
possible termination. Currently, the bulk of the financial burden for
implementation costs falls upon upstream suppliers. 226 This results in a
strong incentive for suppliers to cheat because “[i]f the buyers do not
reward the socially responsible suppliers by purchasing products with
prices reflecting the increase in production costs, the suppliers, in order
to survive, will likely create the appearance of social responsibility
without actually making any improvements.” 227 Analysts of CSR
practices in China have claimed that Chinese suppliers face a strong
incentive to cheat and misrepresent factory conditions because of tension
between improving working conditions (requiring raising costs) and
maintaining low prices in order to remain competitive and retain
contracts with firms from the developed countries.228
In order to encourage upstream suppliers to actually implement good
practices—and not simply hide their violations—these suppliers should
be relieved of bearing the costs of compliance alone. Instead, they
224. See Bajaj, supra note 198.
225. Id.
226. Gould, supra note 151, at 25; Lund-Thomsen, supra note 159, at 1014.
227. Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Accountability Standards in the Global Supply Chain:
Resistance, Reconsideration, and Resolution in China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 321, 335–
36 (2007).
228. Id. at 335; Roberts et al., supra note 167 (“But factory managers in China complain in
interviews that U.S. price pressure creates a powerful incentive to cheat on labor standards that
American companies promote as a badge of responsible capitalism.”).
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should be allowed to transmit the costs of compliance downstream and
without fear that increasing the cost of their prices will terminate their
business with their customers in the developed countries. The challenge,
of course, is to identify who will absorb the increased costs of
compliance. Improved working conditions come at a price and the
tension along the value chain arises from the dispute over who will pay
for these improvements.
B.

Governance Dimension: Transmitting Incentives in a Global Value
Chain

Designing incentives that are “decentralized” and appropriate for
buyers as well as suppliers is only part of the solution. Public actors also
need an effective system for transmitting those incentives to suppliers.
This is a challenge in this age of the fragmented firm that spans multiple
continents. Transmitting incentives to suppliers therefore depends on the
governance used; governance choices determine whether incentives
designed for suppliers can reach suppliers. There are three main
governance options that are discussed here: command and control,
network coordination, and reflexive coordination. As discussed in
Section III.B.1 below, command and control regulation is inadequate to
transmit incentives because of constraints experienced by public actors
at either ends of the value chain: home states and host states. Network
coordination has been advocated as a way to counteract the constraints
of state actors by involving non-traditional actors, such as sub-state
actors and even other stakeholders. However, as explained in Section
III.B.2 below, this form of governance is also not up to the task of
transmitting incentives in the value chain because of the conflicts of
interests between the potential network participants. By contrast,
reflexive law offers a novel approach to governance that allows public
actors and other stakeholders to maximize the incentives that they can
offer suppliers but without the difficulties of bargaining and negotiating
with each other. Section III.B.3 explains the decentralized turn in
governance, illustrated by reflexive law, and proposes a novel
application of reflexive law as an approach to multi-stakeholder
coordination.
1.

The Limits of Command and Control Regulation

Denmark and California may soon be joined by other governments of
multinational buyers that attempt to improve monitoring and disclosure
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requirements, thereby hoping to exert an upward pressure on compliance
standards in global value chains. 229 The limitation of this strategy is that
the weaknesses in the value chain occur beyond the legislative reach of
these states. Requiring greater due diligence and disclosure from
multinational buying firms is a positive development, but the benefits
are limited by the types of upstream responses discussed in Section II.A.
These abuses occur in factories and facilities overseas so that the willing
sovereign is unable to regulate directly the offensive practices or
practitioners. For example, following the collapse at Rana Plaza, the
U.S. and the European Union pressured Bangladesh to change its labor
laws and safety regulations. 230 However, the response by Bangladesh
was to look for alternative markets for their garment exports in order to
reduce their dependence on U.S. and European Union markets. 231
Host States often suffer from weak or non-existent regulatory
capacity that prevents them from enforcing standards and ensuring
compliance. 232 Private regulation through corporate codes of conduct
and monitoring may actually be the only way that labor and
environmental conditions are addressed in some developing countries. 233
China has environmental and labor laws in place, but only attaches
moderate fines to violations because of corruption, lack of resources, and
importance of economic objectives. 234
This weak regulatory capacity can also result in an inability to
perform audits on the local supplier’s facilities. 235 Bolstering
environmental and labor standards may not be viewed as a priority by
host state regulators who may fear that such regulations may
compromise the achievement of economic objectives. 236 For example,
the Bangladeshi government is encountering significant opposition from

229. Hess, supra note 7, at 450.
230. Amrutha Gayathri, Bangladesh’s Garment Exports Surge in July; U.S., Canadian Retailers
Due to Meet to Implement Factory Safety Plan, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2013, 6:22 AM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/bangladeshs-garment-exports-surge-july-us-canadian-retailers-due-meetimplement-factory-safety-plan.
231. Id.
232. See Framework, supra note 2, at 5; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1, at 538–39 (lack of
capacity and willingness to regulate); Natasha A. Affolder, The Private Life of Environmental
Treaties, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 513–14 (2009); Brittany T. Cragg, Home Is Where the Halt Is:
Mandating Corporate Social Responsibility Through Home State Regulation and Social Disclosure,
24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 735, 752 (2010).
233. Locke et al., supra note 76, at 523.
234. Plambeck & Taylor, supra note 164, at 19.
235. Locke et al., supra note 76, at 541.
236. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1, at 538.
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factory owners regarding raising the wage level beyond a certain
point. 237 Host state government officials’ willingness to censure
suppliers is further reduced when those same government officials are
personally connected with the supplier and its operations in the host
state. Many suppliers are supported by government investment, leading
one analyst to remark that “Wal-mart in China is therefore a virtual
‘joint venture’ between the company and the Chinese government.” 238
Host states (and their sub-units) also encounter significant difficulties
in controlling the behavior of upstream suppliers—like contract
manufacturers—operating within their territories because of national and
sub-national competition for the business of these suppliers. In pursuit of
economic growth, local governments, for example, will compromise the
enforcement of labor and environmental laws in order to compete for the
business of suppliers. 239 Local governments vying for Foxconn’s
business offer a full spectrum of resources at their disposal, including
labor. Some township and village governments have provided Foxconn
with free labor recruitment services, while others have imposed a
recruitment quota on their officials. 240 Foxconn is also able to secure
waivers of rent and taxes and to secure these facilities at prices below
market rate. 241 Given this level of solicitation, it is doubtful whether
these same local government officials are willing or able to monitor
compliance with laws and standards that they sacrifice for the sake of a
business relationship with suppliers like Foxconn. As a result of this
dynamic, suppliers exercise a great deal of influence over host state
regulators and policymakers and can impede efforts to change their
practices.
2.

The Limits of Network Coordination

Regulatory networks have dominated contemporary imagination on
how to coordinate activities of actors dispersed across the globe. These
networks are “informal multilateral forums that bring together
representatives from national regulatory agencies or departments to
facilitate multilateral cooperation on issues of mutual interest within the
237. Arun Devnath, Bangladesh Raises Minimum Wage for Garment Workers After Unrest,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 2013, 11:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/print/2013-11-13/
bangladesh-garment-factories-to-stay-shut-amid-worker-protests.html; Gayathri, supra note 230
(noting that wage rates did ultimately improve following the collapse at Rana Plaza).
238. Appelbaum & Lichtenstein, supra note 102, at 109.
239. Ngai & Chan, supra note 98, at 392.
240. Id. at 390–91.
241. Id. at 391.
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authority of participants.” 242 Cooperation through networks provides its
members greater access to information sharing across borders, thereby
improving enforcement efforts. 243 Networks also serve as a forum for
promoting uniformity of standards in order to discourage regulatory
competition between actors. 244 Networks have tackled issues relating to
securities regulation, banking supervision, and insurance. 245
A network approach to enforcement of labor standards in value chains
could offer a productive environment for information sharing,
brainstorming, bargaining, and delegating functions among different
actors. If network regulation of value chains operated similarly to
network coordination of securities regulations and banking supervision,
we would expect to see frequent meetings between governmental
officials of the different states implicated in value chains, such as home
states of multinational buyers and host states of production. Such
meetings could involve agency representatives from departments of
trade or labor who come together to harmonize standards, share
information, and improve enforcement efforts. Network meetings
between sub-state legislators could also provide a fruitful setting for
progress. As discussed in previous sections, the sites of regulatory
competition are increasingly local or regional. 246 Chinese municipalities
compete against each other to woo business to their territory. 247 For
these reasons, the relevant host state legislator is more likely found at the
regional or local level.
Similarly, one of the most robust approaches to regulation of
multinational buyers has also originated from a sub-state legislator:
California. As in the case of host state regulators, sub-state legislators
located in the home state may be a more significant group than national
legislators because legislative movement may be more likely at the subnational level as opposed to the national arena. 248 Therefore, network

242. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J.
INT’L L. 113, 118 (2009).
243. See Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power, supra note 4, at 290.
244. See Raustiala, supra note 5, at 29.
245. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 4, at 287–301 (discussing the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision, International Organization of Securities Commissions, and International Association of
Insurance Supervisors).
246. See supra notes 239–241 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 239–241 and accompanying text; Lin, supra note 227, at 362–63.
248. The Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act (H.R. 2759) was introduced by
Representative Carolyn Maloney to the 112th Congress on August 1, 2011 and was meant to
achieve the following objective: “To require companies to include in their annual reports to the
Securities and Exchange Commission a disclosure describing any measures the company has taken
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meetings between sub-state legislators from home states and host states
might serve as productive settings for convergence on labor standards
and cooperation on enforcement. Labor abuses in value chains are
facilitated by regulatory competition among jurisdictions. This
competition encourages downward pressure on labor standards,
especially by host state regulators desperate to court international
business. 249 Sub-state actors are therefore reluctant to introduce or
enforce adequate labor standards due to a fear that such action might
precipitate business flight from its borders in favor of the country—or
municipality—“next door” that might offer more lax standards. 250
Harmonization of labor standards, therefore, and cooperation and
commitments regarding enforcement might offer a way to limit this raceto-the-bottom situation. The enforcement of comparable labor laws
globally could discourage forum-shopping by multinational buyers and
relieve host states from having to sacrifice labor standards.
However, such a network is compromised by several factors. First,
many networks operate based on voluntary compliance by their
members because of the difficulties with monitoring and enforcement. 251
Harmonization of standards within a network is a product of such
consensus and is unlikely to occur between host state and home state
regulators. This is because labor regulation can serve as a form of
competitive advantage for economies, especially in the developing
world. By harmonizing their labor standards with those found in
developed economies, host states in the developing world reduce or lose
this perceived competitive advantage. They will therefore be resistant to
harmonizing their labor standards with competitors. 252
Of course, networks are also sites of power dynamics. One member’s

during the year to identify and address conditions of forced labor, slavery, human trafficking, and
the worst forms of child labor within the company’s supply chains.” Business Transparency on
Trafficking and Slavery Act, H.R. 2759, 112th Cong. (2011). Congress failed to enact H.R. 2759.
H.R. 2759 (112th), GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2759 (last visited
June 4, 2013).
249. See Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and
Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47, 51–52 (1993) (discussing horizontal regulatory competition
and the risk of “race for the bottom” scenarios).
250. Id. at 58.
251. Verdier, supra note 242, at 118, 130, 163; see also Brummer, supra note 4, at 290–91.
252. See Brummer, supra note 4, at 269–70 (discussing differences in regulatory preferences
because of adjustment costs); David J. Doorey, Who Made That?: Influencing Foreign Labor
Practices Through Reflexive Domestic Disclosure Regulation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 360–61
(2005) (discussing the risk of race to the bottom regulations); Verdier, supra note 242, at 124, 129
(discussing the distributive problems of harmonizing standards).
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reluctance can be overcome by another member’s influence.253 Networks
can be so susceptible to soft power that U.S. participants in transnational
regulatory networks have viewed these networks as conduits for the
export of U.S.-styled regulation to other jurisdictions.254 However, this
may be less true at the sub-national setting where sub-state legislators
have a more limited set of sticks and carrots to offer uncooperative
members. 255 Analysts have also observed that the independence and
efficacy of regulatory networks arise from the nature of issues that are
addressed within network settings. Specifically, networks tend to
confront technical rather than political issues.256 However, labor
standards, which impact economic performance and job prospects for
workers in host and home states, are unlikely to be perceived as a purely
technical matter. Instead, it will be viewed as a significant political issue
that—at least in the United States—must be subjected to democratic
checks. Setting labor standards within networks may also be politically
unpopular because networks are not transparent; instead, networks are
exclusive arrangements that are often secretive. 257 The combination of
exclusivity and secrecy limit access to these networks to a narrow class
of actors and limit participation by other stakeholders. 258 These reasons
help explain why networks also usually address economic or
environmental issues rather than social issues. 259
In addition to these constraints, any regulations produced within
networks of sub-state actors would be limited because of a noticeable
absence from the negotiating table: multinational companies. Effective
reform of the value chain cannot be based solely on public actor action
because these actors’ consolidated leverage does not include the types of
incentives that a multinational buyer could offer suppliers. Importantly,
the latter’s set of incentives may be a necessary condition for securing
supplier compliance.
Of course, one solution could simply be to expand the table to include
representatives from the private sector and even other stakeholders.

253. See Raustiala, supra note 5, at 27.
254. See id. at 32.
255. See Verdier, supra note 242, at 128.
256. See Raustiala, supra note 5, at 24 (“[P]olitical deference to agency actions in international
affairs appears justified by a sense that the issues are narrowly technical—and thus appropriately
controlled by a domestic agency—rather than broadly political, and thus best guided by the foreign
affairs bureaucracy.”).
257. See Zaring, supra note 4, at 303.
258. Raustiala, supra note 5, at 25.
259. Id.
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However, transnational regulatory networks are overwhelmingly
composed of sub-state actors, such as representatives from different state
agencies. 260 This may be due to the fact that counterparts are better able
to understand common issues and interests and therefore better able to
reach consensus. Introducing greater heterogeneity among actors may
impede consensus within networks. Networks are voluntary
arrangements. Multinational buyers may not be willing to participate
within networks. Even if they do so, they might pose a “hold-out”
problem unless they receive satisfactory concessions. As a result, any
resulting regulation may be diluted and ineffective.
The U.N. Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework can be
understood as such an attempt to expand coordination among a greater
spectrum of actors. 261 As such, it offers an illustration of the strengths
and weaknesses of pursuing CSR goals through a network model. The
U.N. Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, John
Ruggie, developed the Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights. The Guiding Principles identify the different responsibilities of
states and corporations regarding human rights. 262 Although these
Principles were developed by the U.N. Special Representative, he did so
only after extensive consultations with a broad range of stakeholders. 263
The distributive problems of network coordination compromise even
the least controversial principle of the U.N. Special Representative’s
approach that addresses the duty of states to protect human rights.
Convergence of state practice on this point is unlikely because many
states—usually those found in the developing world—will face higher
adjustment costs with conforming to more stringent standards. Their fear
that more stringent standards will compromise their global
competitiveness will compromise their cooperation and encourage
similar reluctance by developed economies that do not want their
economies to suffer from asymmetrical enforcement. 264
One of the characteristics of the U.N. Special Representative’s
approach was its transparency and the multiple opportunities that a range
260. Zaring, supra note 4, at 301.
261. See supra notes 143–147 and accompanying text.
262. Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N.
Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (Jun. 16, 2011), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
263. Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, ch. 1, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (Jul. 6,
2011).
264. Surya Deva, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implications for
Companies, 9 EUR. COMPANY L. 101, 103 (2012).
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of actors had to contribute to the Special Representative’s work. 265 The
Principles seemed to enjoy the support of many businesses and industry
groups. 266 This support, however, may have come at a high price. Critics
of the Principles take issue with the aspirational language used, which
they claim should have been replaced with more specific directions to
states and businesses. 267 Others criticize the Principles for failing to
provide monitoring mechanisms or attach any legal accountability to
businesses. 268 It is therefore unlikely that business practices will
significantly improve.
3.

Toward Reflexive Coordination

The effectiveness of command and control or network coordination is
limited because these rely solely on state actors and state based leverage
is insufficient to offer the types of incentives needed for both buyers and
suppliers in value chains.
The limits of state power—either in its command or networked form
—necessitate the need for an alternative approach to regulation that
harnesses the leverage possessed by non-state actors. After all, actors
obey the law for a variety of reasons that may have little to do with the
coercive power of the state. Other institutions and actors reinforce the
proscriptions of the law and the commands of state authority. What is
needed is a form of regulation that explicitly and intentionally
aggregates these non-state forms of leverage in order to achieve the
state’s policy objectives.
Reflexive regulation may be the answer to the recognized limits of
state power. Humility is the origin of reflexive law: Reflexive law is
based on acceptance of the limits of the state alone to achieve all socially
desirable goals. 269 Under reflexive law, the state no longer monopolizes,
or even dominates, regulatory activity. Instead, public actors adopting a
265. Jenna Martin Amerson, “The End of the Beginning?”: A Comprehensive Look at the U.N.’s
Business and Human Rights Agenda from a Bystander Perspective, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
871, 914–15 (2012).
266. Id. at 915.
267. See, e.g., Joint Civil Society Statement on the Draft Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, INT’L FED’N FOR HUM. RTS. (Jan. 2011), http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/
Joint_CSO_Statement_on_GPs.pdf.
268. See Amerson, supra note 265, at 916–17.
269. Doorey, supra note 252, at 370 (“Reflexive law recognizes law’s limitations as a tool for
controlling complex social behaviour. It focuses on the norm-producing potential of intermediate
institutions between the state and markets and private actors and seeks ways to mobilize, to
influence, to steer, to ‘irritate’ those institutions so that they create desirable norms and practices.”);
Orts, supra note 6, at 1265.
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reflexive approach recognize the varied and considerable pressure points
offered by other actors—consumers, shareholders, media, labor groups,
NGOs—that can encourage the targeted industry to make “voluntary
adjustments in their behaviour that are consistent with the goals of the
state.” 270 Reflexive regulation allows these other actors to participate
with state actors in exercising leverage over the targeted industry. 271
This inclusiveness is the first characteristic of reflexive law that
distinguishes it from command and control regulation.
The second important characteristic relates to how state power is
exercised under reflexive law. 272 The fact that a non-state actor has the
potential to wield leverage over the targeted industry does not mean that
it possesses the means to do so effectively. A number of constraints may
prevent a non-state actor from exercising the leverage that it possesses.
One such example of a constraint is information. Asymmetrical
information between consumers and brand firms, for example, prevents
consumers from learning of firm behavior and sanctioning conduct “with
their wallet.”
The role of the state is to convert the potential of non-state leverage
into realized power by removing the constraints that prevent the
effective exercise of that leverage. If non-state actors are prevented from
exercising their leverage because of a lack of information regarding
industry practices, the public actor steps into this void by mandating
disclosures regarding firm practices or establishing a forum for dialogue
on best practices. The public actor facilitates the exercise of leverage by
consumers by improving the flow of information between industry and
consumers.
For example, in the environmental context, environmental labeling is
a reflexive strategy because it creates access to information for the
consumer who can discriminate between products based on the
“environmental friendliness” of the product. 273 The leverage exercised
here is that of the consumer; it is the consumer who brings the pressure
to bear on firms and encourages the latter to make more
environmentally-sound products. The public actor’s only role is to
facilitate the consumer’s ability to exercise her leverage. The public
actors do this by creating a flow of information between private industry
and the consumer so that the latter learns about the environmental
270. Doorey, supra note 252, at 371; see also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1, at 525.
271. See Doorey, supra note 252, at 366; Hess, supra note 7, at 458.
272. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1, at 520–21; Doorey, supra note 252, at 366 (2005); Hess,
supra note 7, at 458.
273. Orts, supra note 6, at 1271–72.
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policies of the different firms and can support or boycott their products
accordingly.
The public actor’s role has therefore changed from direct intervention
and source of sanctions (command and control) to facilitate the ability of
these other actors to consolidate their pressure over the targeted industry
(reflexive law). 274 A public actor fulfills this facilitative role by
establishing processes that guide actors toward socially desirable
behavior: “In becoming reflexive the form of legal regulation changes
from substantive to procedural law.” 275
Reflexive law’s insight has already been applied to the field of
corporate social responsibility by Danish and California requirements for
social reporting by businesses. Social reporting is a form of reflexive law
because “a social report would not mandate that certain predetermined
outcomes be reached, but would instead require a corporation to reflect
on how its practices impact society and to open up dialogues with the
relevant stakeholders.” 276 Like environmental labeling, the leverage
comes from the public, especially consumers. This non-state form of
leverage is particularly significant for value chains involving brand firms
because of their visibility and consequent sensitivity to consumer
preferences. It is the threat of consumer purchasing choices that
encourages brand firms to improve their practices. 277 But consumers
need information in order to wield the wallet effectively. The problem is
that consumers have limited power to obtain that information from
firms. 278 That is where the public actor enters. It is within the public
actor’s power to demand that firms make such information available to
the public. This sets the wheels in motion for consumers and other
stakeholders to respond to that information. 279
This coordination between public and non-public actors demonstrates

274. Doorey, supra note 252, at 366; Hess, supra note 7, at 458.
275. Ralf Rogowski & Ton Wilthagen, Reflexive Labour Law: An Introduction, in REFLEXIVE
LABOUR LAW 1, 7 (Ralf Rogowski & Ton Wilthagen, eds., 1994); see also Hess, supra note 6, at
42–43; Orts, supra note 6, at 1264 (“Reflexive solutions offload some of the weight of social
regulation from the legal system to other social actors. This is accomplished by proceduralization.
Rather than detailed pronouncements of acceptable behavior, the law adopts procedures for
regulated entities to follow. The procedures are adopted with a design in mind to encourage thinking
and behavior in the right direction.” (emphasis in original)).
276. Hess, supra note 6, at 46.
277. See Narine, supra note 148, at 360 (explaining that the Dodd-Frank conflict minerals
reporting provision “depends on consumers and investors to pressure the firms . . . to change their
business practices”).
278. Hess, supra note 7, at 457.
279. Id.; Miller, supra note 8, at 44.
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the capitalization of two forms of leverage over the target firm: the
leverage to command disclosure of information (needed by the consumer
but within the power of the public actor to obtain) and the leverage to
pressure firms to improve practices (desired by the public actor but
within the power of the consumer to demand). These reinforcing
capabilities demonstrate that the strength of reflexive law is that it
incorporates the participation of a variety of intermediaries—such as
media, consumers, and NGOs—into efforts to improve corporate
behavior. Each of these stakeholders has something unique to offer to
recalcitrant actors in the value chain. A reflexive law approach
aggregates the leverage that these combined actors can wield.
Despite these strengths, mandating social reporting—even as
reflexive law—will still fail to achieve the outcomes that its proponents
desire. This is because mandatory social reporting systems—like the
ones in place in Denmark and California—are insufficiently sensitive to
the variety of interests in the global value chain. Its incentives are
tailored to the buying end of the value chain to the neglect of the
suppliers. Disclosures are still dependent upon audits with all the
attendant issues previously discussed. 280 As such, social reporting may
demonstrate a decentralization of governance, but not decentralization of
incentives.
Stakeholders must commit to decentralization in both the form of
governance (reflexive law) and regulations (incentives). This second
dimension of decentralization is what is missing from mandatory social
reporting strategies to combat abuses in the value chain. Reflexive law is
only one half of the solution. Its advantage is its ability to aggregate
leverage from a variety of actors and, as such, it offers a superior form of
governance of transnational CSR norms compared to traditional
command and control regulation. Its limited success in the mandatory
social reporting arena is due to the fact that it has been misapplied.
Reflexive law is a conduit for transmitting incentives; it has failed so far
with CSR because it has been transmitting the wrong types of incentives.
Under social reporting, it has been transmitting incentives to
multinational buyers while neglecting upstream suppliers. As such, it has
succeeded along one dimension of decentralization, governance, but has
failed along the other, incentives. The way to improve the use of
reflexive law regarding CSR is to ensure that the incentives are
addressed to suppliers as well as other actors in the value chain.
280. See supra notes 158–85 and accompanying text (describing the social reporting requirements
encouraged by international, national, and sub-national actors and the ways that suppliers
undermine these efforts).
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IV. GOVERNING AMIDST THE FRAGMENTS: A CHAIN
SOLUTION TO A CHAIN PROBLEM
A fragmented firm requires fragmented regulation, but what does
such regulation look like? It first requires that public actors decentralize
the incentives they offer so that they can target a greater variety of actors
in the value chain. It also requires a form of governance that allows them
to transmit these incentives effectively. Reflexive law has the potential
to achieve both these objectives.
This use of reflexive law results in a model for regulation that
strongly resembles the value chains that it is meant to regulate: 281
fragmentation of regulation according to functional specialization in a
sequence of value adding activities. After all, fragmentation was the
approach that the regulated industries adopted when they faced
constraints similar to those confronted by public actors who are
attempting to regulate activities overseas.
This type of decentralized approach offers a range of benefits. First,
reflexive coordination allows for spatial dispersion among participating
actors and reduces issues arising from jurisdictional and geographic
constraints. Second, one of the advantages of a global value chain is that
it delegates and distributes roles among several actors in a manner that
avoids duplication of efforts, capitalizes on the functional advantages of
the actors, and adds value through a progression of steps.282 Firms that
abandoned vertical integration chose to focus on a narrower set of core
competencies that better reflected their specialized skills. The lesson for
stakeholders is to engage in a similar process of self-examination
regarding their functional advantages in order to identify the best
exercise of their regulatory activity. Indeed, reflexive law encourages
this form of self-evaluation because it is intended to encourage actors to
“contemplate the negative externalities associated with their conduct”
and “make voluntary adjustments in their behavior that are consistent
with the goals of the state.” 283 But this lesson is not meant only for the
regulated private parties. It is also an important lesson for public actors.
This requires recognition of one’s own limits and the advantages of
other intermediaries to reach distant actors.
California’s problem is the one faced by many home state
jurisdictions: inability to regulate suppliers directly. 284 The way that
281.
282.
283.
284.

See Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power, supra note 4, at 288.
See supra notes 44–86 and accompanying text.
Doorey, supra note 252, at 371.
See Barrientos, supra note 83, at 981–82.
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California transcends this limitation is by, first, distinguishing between
target firms and intermediary stakeholders. A target firm refers to the
actor that California wants to ultimately reach and whose behavior it is
attempting to influence. For example, a target firm is a factory manager
of a Bangladesh plant. An intermediary stakeholder is an actor who can
impact factory conditions in Bangladesh and be impacted, in turn, by
California’s own actions. An example of such an intermediate
stakeholder is a downstream buyer that is within the jurisdictional reach
of California.
California has exercised its leverage over downstream firms by
mandating social reporting. 285 However, its current failure is due to its
relative inattention to the interests of suppliers. Changing the primary
audience for reflexive law from buyer to supplier results in a significant
change from how reflexive law is currently used by public actors like
California or Denmark. Under the proper application of reflexive law,
the corporate actor (buyer) is transformed from the target of regulation
to one of many intermediary institutions that will influence the actual
target—the supplier—to change their behavior.
It is important to remember what does and does not change under this
alternative reflexive approach. Public actors, such as California, will still
directly regulate the same actor: multinational buying firms within their
jurisdiction. However, the objective of the regulation has now changed.
It is not ultimately about targeting the buyer’s behavior but incentivizing
downstream buyers with the objective of getting those buyers—as
intermediary stakeholders—to extend particular types of incentives to
their upstream suppliers. This objective impacts the types of incentives
that the public actor would offer in its legislation. This insight should
guide how stakeholders “pull” on the stakeholders within their reach,
such as multinational buyers, to get those actors, in turn, to nudge
suppliers along the pathway to compliance. The following Section
describes changes—from modest to considerable—that California and
other public actors should consider to improve labor standards in global
value chains.
A.

Due Diligence Requirements Regarding Counter-Manipulation

Monitoring efforts by multinational buyers are only as good as the
quality of their audits. The California Transparency in Supply Chains
Act of 2010 (the “California Act” or the “Act”) increases the pressure on

285. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2012).
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buyers to perform due diligence along their value chains. 286 But this
pressure will not result in improved conditions if the audits are simply
manipulated. The weakness of the current Act is that it decentralized
along only one dimension: governance. It adopts a reflexive law
approach by not mandating what a firm must do regarding its due
diligence of its suppliers. Instead, it only requires that the firm disclose
the extent of its action or inaction. 287 The Act relies on non-state actors,
such as consumers and NGOs, to exercise their respective forms of
leverage to encourage firms to change practices. 288
However, the Act is not sufficiently decentralized along the incentives
dimension. It does not explicitly acknowledge the risks created by
supplier audit manipulation. 289 The structure of these disclosure
standards therefore encourages the view that incentivizing the buyingend of the global value chain is sufficient to achieve the changes that
public actors desire. This faith placed in top-down originated auditing
procedures perpetuates the neglect of other actors in the value chain,
including their divergent interests, relative power in the chain, and the
choices they confront.
One relatively direct way to change the Act so that it applies to
suppliers more effectively is for public regulators to require firms to
disclose their efforts to combat audit manipulation. Although the
legislation improves the quantity of audits occurring, it does not do
enough to safeguard the quality of such audits. 290 This is why California,
and other actors considering similar legislation, should add a separate
disclosure requirement mandating firms to disclose what steps they take
to address risks specific to the auditing process, such as countering the
various activities that suppliers engage in to skew the results. For
example, California could amend the Act to include a sixth requirement
that reads: “Performs quality control of its audits to ensure that its
monitoring activities minimize risks of supplier or third-party
manipulation of processes or results.” 291 This addition transforms the
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See supra notes 277–279 and accompanying text.
289. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43.
290. Requiring firms to disclose whether the audit was announced or not is a step in the right
direction so that suppliers cannot use advance warning to hide their infractions. However, even an
unannounced visit is vulnerable to other forms of evasion, such as maintaining double-books, using
uninspected factories, manager-bias, etc.
291. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(2). This section of the California Civil Code requires that
firms “specify if the verification was not an independent, unannounced audit.” This requirement
ensures that suppliers do not use advance warning to hide their infractions. However, even an
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Act so that it is decentralized along both dimensions and now impacts
the decision-making of suppliers more effectively. This may appear as a
modest change to the current status quo but that is its advantage. This
reform capitalizes on the law that is already in place and, as such, offers
a solution that will be more straightforward to implement. By contrast,
the solutions discussed in the sections below outline suggestions for
more significant structural change and therefore may take more time and
resources to implement.
B.

Disclosures Beyond the Audit: Changing Governance in Global
Value Chains

As discussed above, asymmetries in rent and risk perpetuate supplier
suspicions that buyers are not sincere about improving conditions.292
The tension between corporate CSR policies, on the one hand, and
procurement practices, on the other, only compound these suspicions
and make it difficult for suppliers to comply. These frustrations
experienced by suppliers may be a product of the approach to
governance undertaken in global value chains. Under market
governance, buyers tend to use the market to manage their suppliers and,
consequently, it is based on competition among suppliers. 293 Market
governance, therefore, perpetuates the tension between the sustainability
practices demanded by buyers and their sourcing practices. For example,
Nike experienced first-hand the effect of its governance structure on the
implementation of its sustainability objectives. Despite its adoption of a
corporate code of conduct, Nike’s use of a market-oriented approach to
governing its global value chain compromised the effect of such a code:
Though
economically
superlative,
the
arm’s-length
subcontracting system doomed Nike’s first Code of Conduct.
With the buyer threatening to sever the relationship if the
supplier’s pricing was too high, code compliance was secondary
to contractors. Relentless price pressure had also forced final
assembly factories to (re)subcontract parts, materials, and
processes to as many as seven tiers of vendors, further inhibiting
code enforcement. The parties’ economic focus suppressed a
more collaborative CSR partnership between buyer and supplier.

unannounced visit is vulnerable to other forms of evasion, such as maintaining double-books, using
uninspected factories, manager-bias, etc.
292. See Jiang, supra note 166, at 88 (“[S]uppliers’ main objective is to pass the audit, rather than
address the substantive issues that are the focus of the audit.”).
293. See id. at 80.
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Nike was concerned only with the fiscal bottom line and
subcontracting factories were ready to switch to another buyer
for a better economic deal. Due to this aloofness (‘‘my-businessis-my-business; your-business-is-your-business’’), neither had a
serious commitment to improving working conditions. 294
Nike saw improvement in the implementation of its code when it
shifted from a market-oriented governance structure to a collaborative
model with suppliers that was “characterized by a high level of
interdependence underpinned by goodwill and trust.” 295 Under this new
approach, contractors selected into its new governance model received
an “exclusive production relationship and guaranteed minimum monthly
orders . . . . This contracting model provided greater certainty that Nike
and the [selected contractors] would maintain a relationship through
good and bad times.” 296 This alternative governance structure was
supported by information sharing on best practices between suppliers
(previously precluded by high competition in market-based governance),
access to Nike’s CSR experts, and shared responsibility for CSR among
the different actors in the global value chain. 297
The lesson from the Nike case is that changing supplier incentives
may necessitate changing how multinational buyers govern their value
chains. Consequently, the way to offer suppliers effective incentives for
cooperation is to change governance patterns in value chains from
market-based approaches to alternatives that are more collaborative.
Under this reflexive law approach, the public actor should attempt to
alter the behavior of the target firm (the supplier) by changing the
conditions under which the supplier operates. The specific condition that
the public actor is attempting to change is the governance structure in the
value chain. In order to do so, the public actor needs to focus its
attention on the actor who is in the best position to determine the
governance choices in a value chain: the multinational buyer. The
objective is to get the multinational buyer, as an intermediary
stakeholder, to change its governance practices in order to subsequently
affect the compliance rates of its suppliers.
A public actor confronts many difficulties in demanding that private
industries change the way they do business and adopt a different
management approach to their value chains. This is why it is important
294. Lim & Phillips, supra note 194, at 146; see also Yu, supra note 192 (discussing Reebok’s
procurement practices).
295. Lim & Phillips, supra note 194, at 148.
296. Id. at 149.
297. Id. at 148.
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for public actors that adopt a reflexive law approach to identify a second
group of intermediary stakeholders who can exercise leverage over the
multinational buyers to get them to change governance patterns in value
chains. The role of the public actor, as in all reflexive approaches, is to
facilitate the use of this leverage by this second group of intermediary
stakeholders.
One group of potential intermediary stakeholders is consumers.
Mandatory social reporting can be adapted to encourage firms to change
their governance approaches. However, consumers are not armed with
knowledge regarding the differences and consequences of governance
choices on the labor violations at Rana Plaza and Foxconn. Under the
California Act, it is the behavior of the upstream end of the supply chain
that is under scrutiny. 298 What is missing from these disclosure
requirements is attention to the behavior of downstream firms and the
effect of their sourcing practices on the possibility of abuse by upstream
suppliers. Suppliers for Nike and other multinational buyers do not see
the “business case” for CSR when their buyers do not reward
compliance and prefer to award short-term contracts to those suppliers
who can meet their demands on low cost and short lead times: two of the
very factors that often contribute to violations of worker’s rights. 299
This tension between stated goals and actual practices suggests a
causal connection between downstream behavior and upstream effects
that is thus far not reflected adequately in the dominant approaches to
mandatory social reporting. One-sided disclosures reinforce the fear that
the heightened requirements concerning due diligence are only
illuminating the “effect” side of a causal connection between buyers and
suppliers. To the extent that supplier violations are symptoms of
sourcing practices, compliance will not change until the sourcing
practices change.
Consequently, disclosure requirements should be amended to include
information on sourcing practices that have been identified as
contributing factors to violations of corporate codes of conduct. 300 These
initiatives would resemble strategies such as Fair Trade initiatives that
seek to inform discriminating consumers and concerned stakeholders
about the business practices of the retailer and not just the compliance
rate of the upstream supplier. 301
298. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2012).
299. See Bajaj, supra note 198.
300. See Miller, supra note 8, at 41–42; Yu, supra note 192, at 523.
301. What is Fair Trade?, FAIR TRADE USA, http://fairtradeusa.org/what-is-fair-trade (last
visited Sep. 8, 2014).

08 - Parella_Ready for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/9/2014 4:56 PM

808

[Vol. 89:747

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

One reform, therefore, is to change disclosure requirements in the
California Act to include information on sourcing behavior by
downstream firms. For example, downstream buyers could be required
to disclose the following: (a) proportion of compliance costs funded by
downstream buyer, (b) instances when improved compliance resulted in
renewal of contract or other repeat business, and (c) average duration of
contract with suppliers. The aim of these measures would be to improve
transparency regarding the contributing role of downstream buyers to
abuses in global value chains. The hope is that this improved
transparency will lead to public pressure for reform similar to the design
of current CSR disclosure standards. More comprehensive sustainability
reporting is intended to change the focus of consumer attention (and
discrimination) to evaluating the global value chain as a whole and not
the isolated performance(s) of discrete actors in the chain.
C.

Shifting From Unilateral to Bilateral CSR Strategies

The World Bank commissioned a study in order to understand better
the obstacles to improving social and environmental practices by
suppliers. 302 Its study suggests that the resistance by upstream firms to
current CSR practices can also be understood in terms of how CSR
objectives are implemented in the value chain. 303 Many CSR policies of
downstream buyers are implemented in a unilateral, top-down, buyerdriven manner. 304 This unilateral approach to CSR suffers from the
following limitations. First, there is a concern with standard-setting with
suppliers faulting a unilateral approach for its exclusion of them in the
formulation and implementation of codes. 305
Second, there is also a similar concern with capacity-building. Many
buyers concentrate on setting standards (through corporate codes) and
monitoring (through audits) but do not provide local managers with the
support to implement the necessary changes. 306 The weakness of audits
is that they measure non-compliance but they generally fail to provide
local management with the tools to make the necessary improvements. 307
As a result, managers are often overwhelmed by the areas for

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Strengthening Implementation, supra note 220.
Id. at 23–26.
See Jiang, supra note 166, at 86.
Strengthening Implementation, supra note 220, at 26.
Gould, supra note 151, at 25–26.
Id. at 26.
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improvement, claiming that they do not know where to begin. 308
Without the proper training and knowledge on how to improve
conditions in fact, managers instead focus on improving the appearance
of conditions. 309 This oversight is partially due to the buyers’ mistaken
belief that the corporate codes set standards with which a factory can
easily comply. 310 However, there are often significant gaps between
current factory conditions and the required standards and, without
assistance, it is unlikely that managers will improve conditions.311
Finally, there is also frustration from suppliers regarding the allocation
of costs associated with the implementation of improved standards.” 312 It
is no surprise, therefore, that these limitations of the unilateral approach
lead to resistance from suppliers.
The way to correct these incentives is to adopt an alternative model
for corporate social responsibility that rejects a unilateral, buyer-driven,
top-down approach in favor of a partnership model for improving CSR
in the value chain. Such an approach caters to the interests of suppliers
because, like the Bangladesh Accords, it focuses on increased dialogue
between suppliers and buyers on achievable goals, collaborative action
plans, rewards for incremental change, and measurements of continuous
improvement rather than compliance. 313 The advantages of this
alternative approach are significant. Some suppliers believed that codes
that are negotiated “from the bottom up” have a greater chance of
securing a “sense of shared ownership” from suppliers. 314 This could be
a potential strategy for changing the current culture of non-compliance
among suppliers. 315
The model for a bottom-up approach to social responsibility may
come from a domestic supply chain that is challenging the traditional

308. Id.
309. Jiang, supra note 166, at 88 (“[S]uppliers’ main objective is to pass the audit, rather than
address the substantive issues that are the focus of audit.”); see also Plambeck & Taylor, supra note
163, at 2–3.
310. Gould, supra note 151, at 26.
311. Id.; Joonkoo Lee et al., Global Value Chains and Agrifood Standards: Challenges and
Possibilities for Smallholders in Developing Countries, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12,326,
12,327 (2012).
312. See Jiang, supra note 166, at 88; Yu, supra note 192, at 523.
313. Gould, supra note 151, at 29.
314. Strengthening Implementation, supra note 220, at 24–25.
315. Id. Additionally, analysts are skeptical about the possibility of bottom-up approaches in the
absence of long-term relationships between buyers and suppliers. Id. at 26. Hence, it may be
necessary for disclosure of sourcing practices—and changes in those sourcing practices—to occur
as a precondition to a bottom-up approach to CSR.
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top-down, audit based approach to corporate social responsibility. The
Coalition of Immokalee Workers (the “Coalition”) is a worker-driven
community organization that represents low-wage workers in the
tomato, and other harvest industries in Florida. 316 The Coalition has won
several successes for its members and workers in the Florida agricultural
industries, including industry-wide raises of thirteen to twenty-five
percent for workers, assisting with government investigation, and
prosecution of involuntary servitude in the industry. 317 Additionally, and
as discussed below, it also made a serious contribution to improved labor
conditions by starting the Fair Food Program. 318 Its successes have been
so considerable that it has won accolades from the United Nations 319 and
the White House. 320
Part of the reason for the Coalition’s success was that it understood
the economics of the supply chain. In its early years, the Coalition had
unsuccessfully attempted to pressure Florida growers to increase tomato
harvesting piece rates. 321 It began to see success when it realized that the
problem did not begin and end with the Florida growers. Instead, the
Florida growers occupied one tier in a more complex supply chain that
ended with a consolidation of retail power at the top. 322 The combined
buying power of the retail giants at the top of the food chain exerted
significant downward pressure on supplier prices, which resulted in
declining wages and working conditions for the workers at the bottom of
the supply chain. 323
This recognition of the economic reality of the supply chain led the
Coalition to adopt a different strategy that aimed at structural change in
the industry. The Coalition launched the Campaign for Fair Food in
order to incentivize the actors at the top of the supply chain to change

316. About CIW, COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://ciw-online.org/about/ (last visited
Aug. 26, 2014).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Greg Asbed, UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights ‘Impressed’ with Fair
Food Program, HUFFINGTON POST (May 16, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
greg-asbed/un-working-group-on-busin_b_3222906.html.
320. Fair Food Program, COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://ciw-online.org/fair-foodprogram/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
321. Greg Asbed & Sean Sellers, The Fair Food Program: Comprehensive, Verifiable and
Sustainable Change for Farmworkers, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 39, 43 (2013).
322. Id. at 43–45.
323. Id.; Our Brands, YUM!, http://www.yum.com/brands/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014); see also
FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, FAIR FOOD PROGRAM: REPORT 2011–2013, at 7 (2013),
available at http://www.fairfoodstandards.org/reports/FFP_2011-13_web_v1.0.pdf.
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their operations in a way that would produce beneficial trickle-down
effects. 324 The Coalition successfully negotiated a series of binding legal
agreements with food retail giants such as Yum Brands (Taco Bell,
KFC, Pizza Hut), McDonald’s Corporation, Burger King Corporation,
Subway, Whole Foods, Trader Joe’s, and Chipotle. 325 These fair food
agreements commit the retailers to paying a “penny per pound” price
premium for more fairly produced tomatoes. 326 Retailers also commit to
purchasing tomatoes only from growers who comply with the Fair Food
Code of Conduct. 327 This condition creates market incentives for
growers to abide by the terms of the Code of Conduct. 328 The Fair Food
Code of Conduct is distinguishable from many corporate codes of
conduct because it “was born in discussions among workers in
Immokalee, shared with consumers in churches and schools across the
country, shaped in negotiations with participating retailers, and honed
into the working document it is today in an intense loop of
implementation, feedback, and modification in partnership with Florida
tomato growers.” 329
The Code of Conduct is at the heart of the Fair Food Program, which
covers over ninety percent of the Florida tomato industry and “is the
only industry-wide social responsibility program” currently in U.S.
agriculture. 330 The key elements of the Fair Food Program include
(a) worker-to-worker education that informs workers of their rights and
responsibilities so they can identify problematic practices, (b) 24-hour
complaint line and complaint investigation and resolution process,
(c) audits, and (d) enforcement through the market incentives in the fair
food agreements whereby growers who do not abide by the terms of the
Code of Conduct lose the business of the retailers who have signed
agreements with the Coalition. 331
At a surface level, the Fair Food Program (FFP) may resemble other
corporate social responsibility programs because the FFP also includes a
code of conduct and utilizes audits. But the FFP is an example of a

324. Asbed & Sellers, supra note 321, at 44.
325. Id.; see also Highlights: Selected National and International Recognition of the CIW and Its
Members, COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://ciw-online.org/highlights/ (last visited Aug.
26, 2014).
326. Asbed & Sellers, supra note 321, at 45.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 46; see also FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 323, at 10–12.
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Worker-driven Social Responsibility Program (WSR) that is an
alternative to the CSR programs that are generally designed by
corporations. 332 The FFP’s worker-led characteristic has important
ramifications for the operation of the program and differs from CSR in
the following critical ways: 333
• Re-definition of the problem from a public relations issue to a
human rights issue; 334
• Shift from generic “Vendor Standards” to specific codes of
conduct that reflect the bad practices in an industry; 335
• Shift from audit-based monitoring to participatory and
complaint based monitoring. The Fair Food Program’s
worker education informs workers of their rights and provides
avenues for workers to notify other actors when those rights
are infringed. The complaint line is staffed by the actors who
investigate the complaints. The Program also relies on thirdparty audits but their auditors are required to speak with at
least fifty percent of the workers on an audited farm and
sometimes the percentage can be as high as ninety percent.
These percentages are in stark contrast to regular CSR audits
that only engage approximately ten to twenty percent of
workers. The increased attention to workers should reduce the
risk of audit evasion by growers. Under WSR, “workers are
the lead actors in the monitoring of the Fair Food
Program”; 336
• Shift in enforcement by the creation of market incentives for
compliance. 337
The Fair Food Program is successful because it utilizes the strengths
of actors at each tier of the supply chain.338 Through their large
purchasing orders, retailers provide strong incentives for compliance by
their growers. 339 Although the Fair Food Program initially sounds like a
narrative between workers and retailers (the two ends of the supply

332. Greg Asbed, Worker-Driven Social Responsibility (WSR): A New Idea for a New Century,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2014, 3:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/greg-asbed/
workerdriven-social-respo_b_5500104.html.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Asbed & Sellers, supra note 321, at 47.
339. Id.
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chain), it is important to remember the value of the grower-suppliers
who operate in the middle. These suppliers initially resisted the fair food
initiatives and their resistance compromised the effectiveness of the
program. 340 The Florida Tomato Growers Exchange represents ninety
percent of Florida’s tomato growers. 341 It threatened to impose
significant fines against any member-grower who participated in the
program. 342 As a result, the price premium that buyers paid had no way
of getting to the workers because the buyers did not pay the premiums to
the workers directly and the premiums did not pass through entities such
as the Coalition that were outside the buyer’s regular supply chain. 343
The premiums sat in escrow while the Exchange’s members refused to
cooperate. 344 The situation changed in 2010 when the Coalition and the
Exchange reached an agreement to expand the Fair Food Program
throughout the Florida tomato industry; the premiums began to flow to
the workers. 345 One reason for the growers’ eventual cooperation is that
the Fair Food Program does not require that growers bear the entire cost
of change. 346
If public actors are to replicate the successes of the Coalition within
other value chains, their first challenge will be to determine who is in the
best position to encourage private firms to change their CSR strategies
from unilateral to bilateral approaches. The public actor’s first step
toward adopting a reflexive law approach is to recognize its own
limitations to achieving its objective. Second, the public actor needs to
identify an intermediary stakeholder who may be in a better position to
exercise leverage over multinational buyers to get them to change their
CSR approaches. In the example of the Immokalee workers, the pressure
for change at the top came from strategic alliances between farmworkers
and consumers. 347 The public actor’s efforts, therefore, should be spent
in helping these intermediary stakeholders maximize their leverage over
the buyer firms.
In the transnational context, suppliers, frustrated by the dominant
approaches to implementing CSR, may be important intermediary
340. Editorial, One Penny More a Pound, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010, at A22 [hereinafter One
Penny More a Pound].
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 323, at 39.
344. One Penny More a Pound, supra note 340.
345. FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 323, at 39.
346. Id. at 12.
347. About CIW, supra note 316.
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stakeholders who may have potential to change CSR practices. After
studying four case studies of CSR implementation in overseas facilities,
one group of researchers concluded that “while governance pressures
emanating from the global value chain were the leading drivers behind
the adoption of collective action CSR initiatives in the four cases
[studied], local institutions were instrumental in the effective
implementation of collective action responses across all four cases.”348
In particular, “[t]hese collective bodies were critical in the
implementation of CSR monitoring schemes that could ensure
compliance and improve their industry’s standing in the eyes of
stakeholders in Northern-buyer markets.” 349
The involvement of local actors brought several advantages to CSR
implementation. In the Kenyan cut flower industry, for example, the
involvement of leading local industry associations in the Horticultural
and Ethical Business Initiative (HEBI) meant that some of the usual
constraints of traditional monitoring could be overcome. 350 The issues
“associated with tick-box approaches, little time spent in monitoring at
local pack-houses and farms and the use of expensive auditors with
limited knowledge of local contexts” were ameliorated with
participatory social auditing that involved more participation by
workers. 351 This participation was important because it “rais[ed] their
awareness and uncover[ed] less visible issues such as gender
discrimination and sexual harassment.” 352 Participation by local industry
associations can also be important to secure the cooperation of the
industry’s individual members. 353
Improving CSR compliance in global value chains, therefore, may
require empowerment of local actors. For example, in Cambodia,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh, the funding for the responses by local
industry was provided by international agencies, including the U.S.
Department of Labor. 354 California and other public actors could
similarly seek to empower local industry associations so that the latter
may be able to counter-balance the influence of buyers and push for a
348. Peter Lund-Thomsen & Khalid Nadvi, Global Value Chains, Local Collective Action and
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Empirical Evidence, 19 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T. 1,
7 (2010).
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 7–8.
352. Id. at 8.
353. Id. at 7.
354. Id. at 6.
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new approach to CSR strategies. Such an approach is consistent with a
reflexive law strategy because reflexive law seeks to mediate key
relationships between private parties with an eye to counter-balancing
the distribution of power in those relationships: “[R]eflexive law
encourages lawmakers to consider how to motivate and facilitate the
creation of private networks of countervailing power to existing
powerful economic interests. It . . . challenges regulators to explore
possibilities to influence interactions between global capital and these
burgeoning forces of private antagonistic actors.” 355
D.

Summary

The initiatives discussed above are suggestions for fully decentralized
regulation that address the weaknesses of incentives and governance
explained in this Article. Each of these initiatives attempts to correct
misaligned incentives in the value chain. However, this goal could have
been attempted through traditional command and control regulation. For
example, California could have required that all covered entities
eliminate audit manipulation in their value chains, but such a mandate
may prove difficult to enforce because of limitations of proximity,
resources, jurisdiction, and information. Alternatively, California could
have mandated that covered entities change the governance of their
value chains from market-based to relational forms of governance. Such
a regulation is unlikely to occur because it would not be politically
popular. Finally, California could have required that covered entities
change their CSR strategies from unilateral approaches to bilateral
partnerships. Such an approach seems similarly unlikely because public
regulators that have required social reporting, such as California and
Denmark, have opted to require that companies disclose their CSR
policies but have not identified the substantive requirements of these
policies or even required that a company adopt one if it has not already
done so. It is for these reasons that a reflexive approach is necessary to
correct misaligned incentives in the value chain.
Second, it is difficult to prescribe solutions that can be applied across
industries. This is because the “value” in these value chains is derived
from different sources depending on type of product, product life-cycle,
and branded or non-branded nature of the firm. Rana Plaza and Foxconn
share similar risks for worker abuse, but that is where the similarities
end. The electronics made at Foxconn derive a significant portion of

355. Doorey, supra note 252, at 371–72.

08 - Parella_Ready for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/9/2014 4:56 PM

816

[Vol. 89:747

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

their value from the innovative concept and design. 356 The firms who
sell these products make profits because they are offering consumers
something new or something better. This is not the same story for the
garments produced at Rana Plaza, where the garments derive their value
from the brand name that is stitched on the label or by controlling the
costs of making them. The firms who sell these products, therefore,
generally make profit by keeping the cost of labor down. This distinction
is informed by the following two qualifications.
Even within the electronics industry, value will shift from innovation
to cost depending on the stage of the product’s life-cycle and the number
of competitors in the field. With new technology, the firm faces little to
no competition and the value for the product is derived from innovation.
As this technology becomes mundane and new firms enter the market,
the value that the firm extracts will depend less on innovation and more
on controlling costs. 357
Finally, branded firms extract part of the value for their product from
the premium that consumers pay for that brand name. Nike learned a
long time ago that saving costs at the expense of its reputation is a hard
bargain. It therefore invested in implementing its corporate code of
conduct, even including on-site monitors. 358 But not all brand names
have learned Nike’s lesson. Apple is in the midst of its own painful
education and may be more willing now to emulate the example of the
branded shoe firms. 359 Similarly, a brand name clothing company whose
garments are made at Rana Plaza may also be willing to invest in CSR
policies and share that premium—albeit a small one—with its suppliers.
These drivers change, however, when we move from the branded
market to the low-cost discount market where firms survive on beating
price and not on their brand name. When the value from the value chain
only comes from controlling cost in a competitive environment, there
will be greater downward pressure on prices with all the attendant risks
for the workers who operate under those conditions. More importantly,
the drivers for reform will differ. In industries that rely on technology, a
driver for better labor practices is access to a skilled labor force. In

356. See Varian, supra note 62; Supply Chains, supra note 56.
357. For example, Toshiba-Matsushita Display supplied the display used in Apple’s video iPod.
Dedrick et al., supra note 63, at 12. This component was one of the few high-value items, allowing
Toshiba-Matsushita to capture an average gross margin of approximately twenty-nine percent.
However, competition from Korean and Taiwanese entrants reduced Toshiba-Matsushita’s market
rank and contributed to a business environment of “rapid price deterioration.” Id.
358. Lim & Phillips, supra note 194, at 147.
359. See supra notes 98−100 and accompanying text.
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branded markets, the firms will be sensitive to reputational damage.
These drivers are absent when we shift to the non-branded, noninnovative industries where price is determinative of value.
Finally, the suggestions shared here are meant to improve currently
prevailing practices. None of the suggestions will eradicate labor abuses
in value chains. Moreover, like other CSR strategies, they may also be
vulnerable to the problem of unintended consequences. 360 Although the
objective is to improve the conditions of overseas workers, these
suggested initiatives may have the effect of negatively impacting the
welfare of some groups of workers. For example, effective
implementation of CSR may necessitate re-organization of production in
the value chain in order to facilitate improved monitoring and oversight.
When Nike intensified its monitoring efforts in Sialkot, Pakistan, where
many of Nike’s hand-stitched soccer balls are produced, it also changed
the organization of production. 361 Previously, this industry had trended
towards decentralized production in rural, home-based sites that made it
more difficult to monitor compliance with standards, especially
involving child labor. 362 In order to improve monitoring of labor
conditions, Nike required that all production occur within designated
stitching centers. 363 Although such a change improved Nike’s ability to
monitor standards, it likely had an effect on the ability of workers—
predominantly female—to earn an income while still performing
household duties, such as childcare. The centralization of production
precipitated by Nike’s CSR strategy may have made such a balance
more difficult for these female workers. Additionally, accompanying
improved CSR is the looming threat of business flight from countries
that begin to demand more from their Western clients. 364
CONCLUSION
This Article presents a framework for improving the effectiveness of
efforts to reform the global value chain. The key advantage of this
framework is the incentives that it offers to neglected segments of the

360. See Sabel et al., supra note 1, at 14.
361. Lund-Thomsen & Nadvi, supra note 31, at 210.
362. See id. at 209–10.
363. Khalid Nadvi, Global Standards, Global Governance and the Organization of Global Value
Chains, 8 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 323, 335–36 (2008).
364. See Narine, supra note 148, at 391–92 (explaining that opponents of the Dodd-Frank conflict
minerals reporting provision fear that the law will lead firms to source their minerals from other
locations and leave local artisanal miners without any form of livelihood).
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value chain: upstream suppliers. Current CSR efforts are compromised
by their failure to incentivize these actors to cooperate. As a result,
efforts to improve transparency and, consequently, exert upward
pressure on conditions will fail so long as suppliers fail to “buy-in” to
these efforts. Improving the global value chain requires recognizing the
diversity of actors and interests involved and offering incentives that
apply throughout the chain and not just the buying end.
The failure to win supplier cooperation is a result of more than just a
weakness in incentives. It also stems from limitations to transnational
governance and the organization of multi-stakeholder activity. Individual
stakeholders are limited in their ability to influence suppliers directly.
That is why it is important for them to distinguish between target firms
and intermediary stakeholders in order to transmit incentives effectively.
The combination of improved incentives and greater coordination will
not ensure an ideal value chain but it can reduce the likelihood that we
will witness another Rana Plaza or Foxconn.

